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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
For last three decades, many international economists have realized the 
increasing importance of multinationals in international trade and have tried to explain 
the motive and nature of multinational firms. Although a few researchers (Caves, 1996; 
Dunning, 1998; UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1998) realized that the cultural 
difference between countries may affect the strategy choice and the performance of the 
multinationals, the effect of cultural differences between countries has been neglected in 
most studies. The cultural difference affects the performance and the choice of the firm 
in two different ways. First, multinationals from one country (e.g., the US) have an 
intrinsic advantage over multinationals from another country (e.g., Japan) in foreign 
countries that are culturally similar to their own country. For example, US multinationals 
may be seen to have a cultural (not simply geographic) advantage over Japanese 
multinationals in Canada, Europe and Australia, whereas Japanese multinationals are 
perceived to have advantages in other Asian countries, such as Korea, Thailand, and so 
forth. Several empirical studies about the expansion of multinationals show that 
multinationals start with neighboring countries. Davidson (1980) showed that U.S. 
multinationals establish their subsidiary in Canada and then proceed to operate in the 
United Kingdom. Multinationals in other countries show a similar pattern of expansion; 
Japanese firms start in the Southeast Asia (Tsurumi, 1976; Yoshihara, 1978;), Australian 
multinationals go to New Zealand (Deane, 1970), and Italian firms start with 
neighboring southern European countries (Onida and Viesti, 1988). A survey conducted 
by the Bureau of Economics Analysis also suggests that the performance of the US 
multinationals in European countries, Canada, and Australia dominates performance of 
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US firms in Asian countries; Japan, Rep. of Korea, Taiwan (table 1 in Appendix). 
Second, the different cultures (including legal and political system) in different countries 
could make firms establish their affiliate because the multinational can access to the 
difference cultural framework and the cultural-specific consumer demands and 
preferences through their affiliates (Dunning, 1998). 
Another neglected fact of the multinational is the type of products manufactured 
by the multinational and the strategy choice with respect to R&D used to develop those 
products. Previous researches on multinationals usually have assumed that multinational 
firms produce homogenous products in many countries. However we can observe that 
many multinational firms and exporters develop and produce localized products to serve 
specific areas. For example, all Japanese carmakers supply cars that have the driver seat 
on the left side to US consumers although they sell cars with the driver seat on the right 
side in Japan. Microsoft also supplies a different language version of the software in 
different countries. A survey on foreign-based multinationals in the manufacturing sector 
in South Korea conducted by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade 
(KIET) and the Korea Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy shows that 67% of 
the foreign-based firms in Korea produce the standardized and locally adjustable product, 
25% ofMNEs produce the product that is fully localized to fit the Korean market, and 
8% ofMNEs produce the standard product (Kang, et al, 2002, table 3). Most recent 
survey on Korea-base multinationals in the manufacturing sector (D. Y. Kang, et al, 
2004) shows the similar results (table 2). Also the survey on Korea-based multinational 
firms in the manufacturing industry shows that 56% of the Korea-based firms produce 
the standardized and locally adjustable product in the host country, and 21% of them 
produce fully localized products, and 23% of them produce the standard product (Kang, 
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et al, 2003) (table 2). 
The above surveys suggest that most multinational firms produce localized or 
localizable products instead of standard products. Furthermore most multinationals 
prefer to develop a standard product and adjust it to fit local preference. Although these 
different types of products and technology were studied in the literature on the flexible 
technology (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994; Norman and Thisse, 1999; Norman, 2002), it is 
neglected in researches on the multinationals and exporters. This dissertation examines 
(1) the role of the culture-specific demand on the strategic behavior of the firms, (2) 
when and why multinationals and exporters introduce localized products instead of 
standard products facing cultural difference between countries, and (3) the influence of 
the cultural different between two countries and the strategic decision of firms on the 
welfare in the home and the host country. Multinationals in this dissertation are assumed 
to have an advantage in the information about local preference over exporters. 
Horstmann and Markusen (1996) examined the knowledge advantage of a local firm 
over an exporter. They assumed that local agents have superior information for the local 
market, a potential the MNE doesn't have. Therefore an MNE should face asymmetric 
information problem in contracting with an agent and pay additional rent to the agent 
when the MNE chooses the contract over FDI. They found that the asymmetric 
information problem could lead a potential MNE to choose FDI with the additional cost 
in order to obtain the market information. Multinationals in this paper are assumed to 
observe the true preference in the foreign country that is uncertain to exporters and 
utilize this superior information to develop and produce variety. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In the second chapter of the 
dissertation, I will develop the model to study the effect of the culture-specific demand 
4 
in the host and home country on the firm's choice of the location and will expand it to 
include various types of products, assuming a monopolist. The developed model will 
explain when and why a monopolist decides to be a multinational or exporter facing the 
cultural difference and various types of production methods. Furthermore I will discuss 
why and when this firm chooses to produce a standard variety or two different localized 
varieties. In addition, the second chapter will study the welfare in the home and the host 
country in various situations. 
The third chapter will extend the monopoly model used in the second chapter to 
study an effect of cultural similarity among countries on the strategic interaction of two 
multinationals. To illuminate this, I will consider two multinationals that are from two 
different home countries that have different cultures; therefore, one firm possesses an 
intrinsic advantage in adjustment cost over the others. The two multinationals are 
assumed to supply their home country and are considering entering the host market; that 
is, the multinationals can either develop a new localized variety (or platform) to serve 
the host market or adjust their current variety for their home markets to serve the host 
market. In this situation, the third chapter will study, using the technology developed in 
the second chapter, the optimal production strategy of the two multinationals from the 
two culturally different home countries. Also profits of the two firms in the host country, 
the effect of the cultural difference on the firms' optimal choice, and consumer welfare 
in the host country will be discussed. 
In chapter three, it is assumed that, if a multinational(s) decides not to create a 
new localized variety, it can adjust only its current variety to serve the host country; 
define this variety as a platform. This assumption will be relaxed in the fourth chapter, 
and I will allow that the multinationals can choose their platform for the adjustment 
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process. In detail, I will consider a situation that two multinationals in two different 
home countries have their production facilities in their home countries and are 
considering entering the home and the host markets simultaneously. Using this modified 
duopoly model, I will study equilibrium of the duopoly game and strategic behaviors of 
the two multinationals. Further, consumer welfare in the home and the host countries 
also will be discussed. 
In fifth chapter, the model used in chapter four will be modified again to include 
asymmetric competitions in the two home countries; that is, the two multinationals face 
different level of home competition because the different number of local competitors 
exist in the two home countries. Using the modified duopoly model, I will revisit the 
pattern of equilibrium of the duopoly game and will study the effect of asymmetric home 
competition on multinationals' strategic decisions, consumer welfare in the countries, 
and profits of multinationals. 
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Chapter 2. A Firm's Choice of the Technology and the Location under 
the Cultural Difference: Simple Monopoly Model 
Introduction 
As Dunning (1998) mentioned, different culture in any country provides the 
firm an incentive to establish its affiliate in that country because the multinational can 
learn that different cultural framework and the cultural-specific consumer demands and 
preferences. This chapter of the dissertation develops a theoretic model of a monopolist 
to support his assertion using a Lancaster-type preference and the technology developed 
by Eaton and Schmitt (1994). With this structure, I will discuss the simple model of a 
firm to discuss a firm's choice of the optimal technology as well as location of its 
production. In addition, the impact of these choices on welfare in the home and the host 
countries will be studied. 
This chapter is organized in following way. The first part of this chapter will 
study a firm that is considering entering the host country by exporting or establishing its 
affiliate. The firm is assumed to have already developed a platform for its home market 
and is considering whether to develop a new platform for the host market or to adjust its 
current platform. Under this situation, given the cultural differences between the home 
and the host countries, I will develop a monopoly model to examine the firm's choice of 
optimal technology and location. Further, the welfare in the host and the home country 
facing the firm's strategic choice will be studied. The second part of the chapter will 
extend the monopoly model to include the initial platform of the firm and study the 
firm's decision and welfare issue. The developed model and results will be summarized 
in the conclusion of this chapter. 
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Model 
Assume that there are two countries: the potential host (or foreign country) 
country K and home country U. Assume that there is only one firm in this economy 
which produces product in its home country; a good with no close substitutes. Further, 
this firm is considering entering the host country either by exporting or by establishing 
its own affiliate. Finally, assume that each country has a specific preference for the 
product that the firm produces. Therefore, the cultural similarity between two countries 
is assumed to be measured by the similarity in taste for this product. 
Turning to preferences in the countries, assume that all consumers in a country 
have identical preferences for the product and prefer to consume a specific type of 
variety 9', i = K,U . The preferred variety of a product may be different across 
countries. Assume that a consumer in country i has the sub-utility function1: 
where 6f is the variety that is supplied by the firm in country i ,  ( a ,  y ,  X) are positive 
parameter, q represents total sales of products (including all varieties), and 
d (6'\ 9' ) = |<9/' -9' | is the distance in the variety space between the actually supplied 
variety and the ideally preferred variety. 
From the utility function, the demand of a consumer for a product of variety 9 ' '  
1 We assume overall preferences are separated quasilinear, so we can ignore income effects on the role of 
other prices. 
w,  ( q )  =  max 
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is given by: 
p i =a-yd (e f , f f ) -Xq i  
Let N t  be the population of country i ,  and it measures the market size in country i .  
Then the aggregate demand for <9f is: 
Thus, the demand increases as the firm supplies a closer variety to 6f . Finally, assume 
that a local producer, including a multinational, can observe the true type of 9 ' , but this 
taste parameter is unknown to the foreign exporter at the beginning. I will discuss the 
detailed sequence of revealing the information on the local preference to the foreign 
exporter. 
For the technology, I use a framework that is similar to the framework 
developed by Eaton and Schmitt (1994)2. Suppose that the firm is considering entering 
the market in the host country by exporting the products or establishing its affiliate in the 
host country. Assume that there is no transportation cost for an exporter to ship the 
p roduc t s  t o  t he  hos t  coun t ry ,  and  e s t ab l i sh ing  an  a f f i l i a t e  r equ i r e s  t he  f i xed  cos t  E K  .  
2 They developed the flexible technology that the firm can produce any final products from base products 
with adjustment costs to study firms' entry, preemption and merger in a market with evenly distributed 
consumer preferences. Norman and Thisse (1999) used the Eaton-Schmitt model to analyze the entry and 
preemption allowing 'designated (or specialized) technology'. Norman (2002) also adopted the Eaton-
Schmitt model to discuss the firm's choice of level of the flexible technology and the location of the base 
products in many submarkets. This chapter of the dissertation is closely related with the Norman and 
Thisse paper (1999) because my model also allows the localization strategy that matches to their 
designated technology 
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Further, if the firm decides to enter the host market, it can supply the current product 
used in its home country, that may be different from dK , or it can develop a new 
platform 6PK for the host country. With the latter strategy, the firm incurs the fixed 
R&D cost VJ 3. Finally, assume that the firm can transform one variety to another variety 
with additional marginal cost. 
Definitions:4 
1. The adjustment technology is the process that transforms one variety to a 
different variety with additional marginal cost, which depends on the similarity 
between two varieties. 
2. The platform variety is the prototypes of the variety before the adjustment 
technology is applied. 
The additional marginal cost due to the adjustment technology can be thought as 
the marginal costs that are required to change the characteristics of the product (e.g., 
from left-hand drive to right-hand drive) from the current platform without developing a 
new platform. The additional adjustment marginal cost to transform ff to 0' is 
defined by b\d' - 6' | where b is a positive parameter. Therefore, the marginal cost of 
the firm to produce a variety 6j by adjusting the platform 6' is 
c {d', 6' ) s c + b |é>' - dJ |. Assuming b < y, the firm always supplies the ideally 
3 This strategy is essentially the same to the 'designated technology' in Norman and Thisse (1999) and 
Norman (2002). Also it is similar with the 'dedicated ' production strategy in Chang (1993, 1998) or the 
'inflexible' technology (e.g. Boyer and Moreaux, 1997). Notice that the multinational can achieve the 
mass production with this production strategy since it has the lower marginal cost than the alternative. 
4 The adjustment technology is technically the same to the flexible technology that was developed by 
Eaton and Schimitt (1994). The platform variety is also matched with the base variety in their model. 
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preferred variety to a country if the firm can observe ideally preferred variety. 
The sequence of the firm's decision and the revelation of information concerning 
preferences are as follow: 
1. The firm decides whether to enter the foreign market and, if it enters, whether to 
be an exporter or a multinational by establishing its affiliate. If the firm becomes 
a MNE, it learns the true preference. Further, the firm decides whether to 
develop a new platform or use the current platform to serve the foreign market. 
2. The uncertainty regarding preference in the host country is resolved for the 
exporter, and the firm can adjust the platform to serve the host market5. Given 
the locational and platform decision of the firm in the first stage, the firm 
chooses its output. 
At the first stage, local producers, including multinationals in host country K,  can 
observe the true type of dK , but this parameter is unknown to the foreign exporter at the 
beg inn ing  o f  t he  pe r iod .  The  expo r t e r  on ly  knows  the  d i s t r i bu t i on  o f  t he  t ype  o f  9 K  :  
§K follows a uniform distribution with mean 0 and 6K e \^-s6u, sdu j where 
0 < s  < 1 is a parameter. Since the expected preferred variety in country K is zero, 9 U  
is the cultural distance measured by the distance in the preference between the home-
preferred variety and the expected foreign-preferred variety, and the exporter faces 
higher demand uncertainty as the cultural similarity between the host and the home 
countries decreases. 
5 The idea behind this sequence is that developing a new platform is a long-run process but adjusting a 
platform is a short-run process. 
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Finally, assume that the firm can earn positive monopoly profits in host country 
K 
Assumption 1: 
1. The monopoly firm earns positive profits in the host country when it adjust any 
p l a t fo rm t o  s e rve  t he  hos t  coun t ry  and  0 '  e  [ - [a  -  c )  / 2b ,  ( a  - c )  /  2è ] ,  i  =  U ,K  .  
2. Developing a new platform to serve the host country is profitable for the 
monopoly. 
Decision of Location and Incentive to be a Multinational 
At the first stage, the firm chooses the optimal locational strategy and the R&D 
decision to maximize its expected profit. The decision of the firm can be analyzed by 
backward solution. Further, notice that the firm has four possible strategies: exporting by 
adjusting the current home-preferred platform (SAE strategy), exporting by developing a 
new localized platform (LAE strategy), local production by adjusting the current 
p l a t fo rm (SA  s t r a t egy ) ,  and  loca l  p roduc ing  by  deve lop ing  a  new loca l i zed  p l a t fo rm (FL  
strategy). In addition, note that since the exporter can adjust the platform after the true 
foreign-preferred variety is revealed and b < y, supplying 0K is more profitable for 
the exporter than losing demand by producing dpK # 0K 6. Finally, assume 6U > 0 
without loss of generality. 
6 The loss of demand due to producing non-preferred variety is redundant in this paper because b  <y  
I included this assumption for the loss of the demand to achieve more completeness of the model. 
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Expor t e r  
Suppose the firm decides to export the products by adjusting its current platform. 
The  expec t ed  p ro f i t  o f  f i rm  U i n  t he  hos t  coun t ry  w i th  t he  cu r r en t  p l a t fo rm 6 U  (SAE  
strategy) is: 
^ 
124 
Notice that 6U represents cultural (or preference) difference between the home and the 
foreign countries because the mean of the foreign-preferred variety is assumed to be 0. 
Moreover, En S A E  is decreasing as 6 V  increases for 9 l J  e [0,(a-c)/2/>J7. 
Suppose the firm decides to export by developing a new localized platform 
(LAE  strategy). The exporter chooses the new platform d ' K  to maximize the following 
expected profit in country K:  
1  N K  
2c#" 44 
[a -c -bd{9^ ,d K ^  —V t  
Note that the exporter can adjust the platform 0'K after the true host-preferred variety is 
revealed if 6PK^QK. The optimal localized platform of the exporter is the expected 
hos t -p r e f e r r ed  va r i e ty :  0 P K  =  0  .  The  expec t ed  p ro f i t  o f  t he  expo r t e r  i n  hos t  coun t ry  K 
7  dEn  K _ NK 
-36(a -c -26^) -6^(3-2e ' ) l<0  because  a  
given range of 0 U  and 3  — 2£ 2  >0 for £ G [0, l]. 
c-26^>0  for  
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with 0K = 0 is: 
124 
3 (a - c)' - (a - c) + )' -K  
Also this profit is decreasing in 6U 8. The exporter chooses its strategy by comparing 
and 
Proposition 2.1: 
Suppose the monopoly profit of an exporter in host country K is profitable. Then: 
1. If the R&D cost is considerably high, that is V i  > -  c f  (2 - s f , then 
16/1 
entering with the current platform without developing a new localized platform 
(SAE) is the optimal production strategy of the exporter. 
Assuming V j  < {a  -  c f  (2 - s f ,  
2. The exporter enters with the home-preferred platform if 0U < 0'^vcr and the 
home and the host countries have high cultural similarity. 
3. If 0 U  e [d" o w e r , (a  -  c )  /2è], the exporter enters the host market developing a 
new localized platform. 
where 
ce [0,1]. 
îk. 
124 
-36e (a - c - 26^ ) - 26"e^ (3 - g)l < 0 for ^ e [0, (a - c) / 26] and 
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Proof: 
From the profits EtvSKAE and EN ,^ 
En^h - Ex'k4E = Vt 4^-^—[bdu -(a-c)(2-e-)), which is a quadratic function with a 
positive coefficient on the second order term. Notice that, 
when0 u =— (2 - s ) (a - c )±^ (a -c ) 2 (2 - s ) 2 - l ôAVt /Nx  ,  En s f  -En^ E  = 0 .  
From the assumption 1, 9"ower <~—-
2b  
where 91  
2b  
the lower and the upper values of the critical 6U such that EnfE = En'^h at 6"omr 
and 6"pper respectively. Therefore, Enf '  >  En ' f ' :  if 0U £ [^wer,(a-c)/2è] . 
Otherwise, EnSAE < En'KAE. Clearly, 6"ower and d"pper exist only if 
Proposition 2.1 suggests the following. When the R&D cost is too high, the 
exporter enters with the current platform and saves this high R&D cost. When the R&D 
cost is not too expensive, if the home and host countries have similar culture and tastes, 
the exporter also uses the current platform to supply the foreign market by adjusting it 
because the adjustment cost is considerably cheap. If the two countries have 
considerably different tastes and the R&D cost is not too high, the exporter chooses to 
develop a new localized platform because adjusting the current platform for the foreign 
market costs too much. 
% < ^ ( a - c f ( 2 - c ) \ l f  f o r a l l  2 " .  
QED 
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From the functional property of 6"ower, the following proposition for the 
comparative static property holds. 
Proposition 2.2: 
The smaller is the variance of the uncertain preference in the host country, the higher is 
the fixed R&D cost, or the smaller is the host market, the larger the range of 9U for 
which the exporter will find it desirable to adopt the SAE strategy. 
Proof: 
To verify the first statement in Proposition 2.2, differentiate 6\!mnir with respect to s 
a# 
de  26 
a-c -
(a - c )  ( 2 - e )  
< 0  
As the variance of the uncertain preference in the host country decreases, 9%wer 
increases, the range of 6U for the multinational to adopt the SAE strategy becomes 
larger. 
The second and the third statements can be verified in similar ways. 
1 _ 44 
dV> bNK ^(a~cf (2-s)1 -\6XVJNk 
4AK 
> 0 and 
< 0  
Therefore, the higher is the fixed R&D cost, or the smaller is the host market, the larger 
range of 0U will find the exporter to adopt the SAE strategy. QED 
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The first statement implies the following. If s becomes smaller, the exporter 
faces less risk with respect to the host-preferred variety, and the expected profit of the 
exporter increases. Furthermore, since the adjustment process is applied after the true 
preference in the host country is revealed, the effect of the smaller s on profit with the 
SAE strategy is relatively smaller than it is with the LAE strategy. The intuition behind 
the  s econd  s t a t emen t  i s  obv ious .  When  the  f i xed  R&D cos t  becomes  h igh ,  t he  LAE 
strategy which requires the higher R&D cost than the SAE strategy becomes less 
profitable. The third statement in Proposition 2.2 implies that, as the host market 
becomes larger, the exporter prefers a strategy that has lower marginal cost in the host 
country (LAE strategy). 
Mul t ina t i ona l  
Now consider the case which the firm decides to establish an affiliate in the host 
country and then becomes a multinational. Suppose the multinational uses its current 
platform for home country Uto serve the foreign country K by adjusting it (SA strategy). 
Since the multinational can observe the true preferred variety in the host country, the 
profit with the SA strategy in the host country is: 
where 0K is the observed host-preferred variety. 
If the multinational decides to develop a new localized platform for the host 
country, the profit of the firm in the host country becomes: 
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Notice that the multinational develops and serves 9 K  without using the adjustment 
technology because the firm can observe the preference. 
Given n™ and nr^, the multinational chooses the optimal strategy to 
maximize its profit. 
Proposition 2.3: 
Suppose the monopoly profit of the multinational in the host country is positive. Given 
the  revea led  0 K ,  
1. The multinational uses the current platform to serve the host country if 
2. The multinational develops a new localized platform to serve the host country if 
where d  =  ^ a - c - ^a -c f  -4AV f  / #% j .  
Proof: 
From the profits of the multinational, 
n S A -n F £  =^ - [a -c -bd[d u  , 6 K f )  +V n  and =n ' ^  at 
d(9 u  , 6 k }  =  d ,  where d  =^^a -c - ^ {a -c f  -4XVJ  N K  j . Further, n S A >n r K L  if 
d{9u ,6K^<d, and nSA<nFKL if d (du ,0K^ > d. Notice that d always exists 
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because the monopoly profit of the multinational is assumed to be positive and 
(a-cy-4AP:/A^>0. QED 
Similar to the exporter case, Proposition 2.3 implies the following. If the home 
and host countries have similar tastes, the multinational uses the current platform to 
supply the host market by adjusting it because the adjustment cost is relatively less 
expensive. If the two countries have considerably different tastes, the multinational 
chooses to develop a new localized platform because adjusting its current platform for 
the host market costs too much. 
From the functional property of d, we have the following comparative static 
result: 
Proposition 2.4 
As the size of the host market becomes larger, the multinational is more likely to develop 
a new localized platform to serve the host country. 
Proof: 
Take the derivative of d  with respect to N K : 
44% 
= — < 0 
^ 6#/ - c)' - 34% / 
Therefore, as N K  increases, d  decreases and the larger range of 6"  will find that 
the FL strategy is optimal for the multinational. QED 
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Proposition 2.4 means that, when the host market is large, the multinational can 
earn  h ighe r  ope ra t i ng  p ro f i t s  by  choos ing  t he  s t r a t egy  t ha t  ha s  l ower  marg ina l  co s t  (FL  
strategy) 
Optimal Choice of Location and Platform 
When the firm decides the locational choice between being an exporter and a 
multinational, the firm faces uncertain profits. The expected profits of the exporter are 
EnfE or E?, depending on 0". The uncertain profits with the multinational 
strategy also depend on 6J. If -sO" > s6u - d, the multinational always adopts the SA 
strategy because the two countries have sufficiently similar taste. If 
-sQu <9U - d< s9u, the multinational may use the SA strategy or the LA strategy, 
depend ing  on  t he  r evea l ed  d K  .  O the rwi se ,  t he  mu l t i na t i ona l  a lways  adop t s  t he  LA 
strategy for any revealed 0K . The expected profit in each case is: 
.MNE 
If  2" 
20 
Ex ante, the firm compares EnMSE and may.\jLnfE,En'^lE~^ to choose its best 
locational strategy. 
Proposition!. 5: 
Suppose (a - c)' (6 - e) e. 
1. There exists 0lower e 
exporter if 0U < 0"ow 
2. There exists 
d / ( \  +  s ) , ( a - c ) / 2b  such that the firm becomes an 
d / ( l  +  s ) , {a - c ) / 2b  such that the firm becomes a 
multinational if 6U > 0"pper. 
Proof: 
First of all, the expected profits of an exporter and a multinational are maximum at 
0 U  =0 9 .  When 0 U  = 0 ,  En^  =— (a -c ) 2 -E K  <-(a -c ) 2  = E tt^ e .Moreover, 
44 ^ ^ ^ 44 ^ ^ 
the expected profits are minimum at 0 U  = (a -c)/ 2b  that is the maximum of 0 U .  
Assuming  E K  (6 - s ^ s ,  En M N t  > En L K E A  a t  0 U  = a ^  : 
-cf - % - E. > -cf (l2 - 6e + e") - % = 
<-> Ek <-^-(a-cf (6-g)g > 0 
* 484^ / ^ ' 
Now consider the slopes of the profits. The slopes of all profit functions are decreasing 
9 nU 0 =0 eliminates both variance and cultural dissimilarity 
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in 0U and have following properties; 
a^^ 
> 
a^ a^ 
a^^ a^^ 
a^ a^ 
> 
aE^ 
= o, a^^ > 
a^^ 
> 
a^ a^ a^ a^ 
= 0, and 
Because E n M N E  < E n f E  at 0U = 0, En^ >En^E at 9U =[a-c)/2b, and profit 
functions are continuous and decreasing in 0U, there exists such that 
En < En for 6 < 6,mer from the mean-value theorem where En is the 
profit of the exporter. Likewise, there exists 0 such that En > En for 
0U > 0"pper from the mean-value theorem. 
Further, we can show d  /  ( l  +  £ • )  <  0 ]  !U • 
From the definitions of d and 0"ower, 
t f o w e r - d I { }  +  £ ) - —  ( 2 - e ) ( a - c ) - - J ( a - c )  ( 2 - s ) - l 6 X V J N K  
d 
1 +  s  
<-> 
1 +  s  
l+s 
~2b 
^(2 - s ) ( a - c ) - ^ j ( a - c ) 2  (2 - £ )  - \ 6 A V j  /  N K ^ j - d  
Notice that the expression in the bracket is an increasing function in s and positive at 
s = 0. Therefore, 0"ower - d / (l + e) > 0 for all £ e (0, l). 
Because 
aE^ 
a^ a^ 
and 6//(l + g)<^,itis clear that at 
9" =d/(} + £). Therefore, ê"ower >dl(\+s) and êuupper >d!(\ + s). QED 
For certain a range of E K ,  0 " o w e r  and ê"pper are in the range of 
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Corollary 2.5.1: 
When £, < N*shà 
12^(1-g) 
3 ( a - c ) ( \ - s ) - s b d  , there exist Ô " o w e r  and 6'm>cr such that 
f r  f 
ulower fc 
Proof: 
d l { l  +  s ) , d l { \ - s ) \  and ê " p p e r  e . \ d I ( \  + e ) , d I [ \ - s )  
EnMNE > En^E at 9 U  = d / ( l - s )  when E K < — 3(o-c)(l-g)-gW 
From the continuity of the profits and the mean-value thermo, 9 " o w e r  < d  / ( \ - s )  and 
QED 
Proposition 2.5 implies that the firm becomes a multinational when the host 
country has a very different culture from the home country. In this case, the firm faces 
high preference uncertainty due to the cultural difference. However, the firm decides to 
be an exporter when the host and home countries have relatively similar culture. Notice 
that the LAE strategy of the exporter and the MNE strategy are the strategies to reduce 
the preference uncertainty. Therefore, the MNE strategy replaces the LAE strategy when 
the firm faces high cultural difference in the host country. 
Welfare of the host country 
Since the firm always serves the home country with the base marginal cost, the 
welfare of consumers is independent of the firm's decision on technology and location. 
However, the firm's strategic decision affects the welfare in the host country. The 
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welfare in the host country is largest when the firm becomes a multinational and adopts 
the FL strategy because the firm serves the host market with the base marginal cost. The 
host country's welfare is lowest when the firm adopts the SAE or the SA strategy. 
^ ^ 
where W'K is the welfare in host country K. Note that the exporter with the LAE 
strategy is better for the host country than the multinational with the SA strategy. 
Consider the situation that Ev < 
N„sbd 
3(a-c)(l-s ) - s b d  and 
\ 2 X ( \ - e )  
Corollary 2.5.1 holds. The order of welfare in the host country, Proposition 2.5 and 
Corollary 2.5.1 imply that the multinational may reduce the welfare of the host country 
for some ranges of 0U and revealed 6K . 
Corollary 2.5.2: 
Assume E„ < -
Nvsbd 
121(1 - s )  
3 { a - c ) { l - s ) - s b d  . Allowing a multinational reduces the 
welfare in host country if d" e Ô'm>cr ,d / (l - s) and true 6 K  < d - 9 u  .  
As shown in Proposition 2.5, when 6U G ê"pper, d/(1-È-) the firm decides to 
be a multinational. Further, if the true (but unobserved by the exporter) d K  is 
6k <d-6u, the multinational adopts the SA strategy after 0K is revealed. Notice that 
the optimal strategy of the exporter for this ranges of 0U and 6K is the LAE strategy 
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if the multinational is not allowed. Since W^E > W^A, the host country becomes worse-
off by allowing the multinational. 
Since W E L  > W ^ A  and W^E > W^AE, the following corollary also holds. 
Corollary 2.5.3 
The host country will be better off if a culturally dissimilar exporter or multinational 
enters. 
If the entrant has a similar cultural background to the host country, the firm is more 
likely to adopt the SAE or the SA strategy. Since it incurs higher marginal cost due to the 
adjustment process, the consumer welfare in the host country is reduced. 
Choice of the Platform Variety 
In the previous part of this chapter, I assumed the initial platform variety was 
given for the firm. Therefore, the firm only can adjust its current platform when it adopts 
the adjustment technology or creates a second platform. In remaining part, I will relax 
this assumption and allow the firm's choice of the platform. To do so, consider the 
situation in which demand for a new product emerges simultaneously in the home and 
host country. Suppose that a firm has its production facility in the home country and 
considers entering the home and host markets. As on the previous case, this firm can be 
either an exporter or a multinational. Assume the technology and the preference structure 
in the previous example hold here. Other assumptions made previously still hold in the 
remainder of this chapter. Without loss of generality, assume 0U >6K. Finally, 
normalize the market size of the home country: Nv = 1. 
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Exporter 
Suppose the firm decides to be an exporter and adopts the SAE strategy. Since 
the exporter can choose its platform variety, the expected profit depends on the choice of 
the platform variety. The expected joint profit in the two countries is: 
- K  
where 6SP is the standard platform. The first term is the profit in the home country and 
the second term is the expected profit in the host country. Note that the SAE strategy 
incurs Vt because the exporter develops a standard platform variety. From the 
convexity of the expected profit, the exporter's optimal choice of platform variety is 6U 
or 0, which is the expected value of 0K , depending on the relative market size in the 
host country. 
Proposition 2.6: 
Suppose an exporter adopts the SAE strategy. 
1. If Nk > 1, the exporter uses the expected host-preferred variety as its platform. 
2. If NK < 1, the exporter uses its home-preferred variety as its platform. 
Proof: 
Given the monopoly profit with the SAE strategy, this follows from the comparison of 
EnSAE(du^ and EfcSAE (0), and the properties of the distance function d (6U ,0K = ()). 
QED 
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Proposition 2.6 suggests that, when the exporter adopts the SAE strategy, the 
exporter uses the (expected) preferred variety in the larger market as its platform variety 
to reduce the marginal cost and earn higher profit in that market. 
Now suppose that the exporter adopts the LAE strategy. The exporter's joint 
profit maximization problem is: 
The first term in the round bracket is the profit in the home country and the second term 
in the round bracket is the profit in the host country. The optimal localized platform of 
the exporter is the expected host-preferred variety: dpK - 0 . The expected joint profit of 
the exporter is: 
+J&-
/ 12A 
3 { a -  c f  -  b s d u  { a  - c) + b 2 s 2  { d u  )  -2 V, 
Note that En^ is decreasing in 6U10. 
The optimal production method of the exporter is the strategy that provides the 
higher profit. When NK < 1, the optimal platform for the SAE strategy is the home-
AT, 
*e[0, l]  
12A 
-6f(a-c-26^)-26W/(l-e)l<0 for ^e[0,(a-c)/26] and 
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preferred variety, and this model is identical to the monopoly model given the platform 
that was discussed in the previous part. Therefore, Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 hold here. 
However, when NK > 1, the exporter chooses the host-preferred variety as the platform 
when it adopts the SAE strategy and Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 should be modified slightly. 
Proposition 2.1': 
Assume NK > 1. Suppose the monopoly profits of an exporter in the host and the host 
countries are profitable. Then: 
1. If the R&D cost is sufficiently high, that is, Vi > [a - cf (2 - sNK )2 /16 A, then 
the exporter adopts the SAE strategy and chooses the host-preferred variety as its 
If %<(a-cy(2-e#j'/16/l,then: 
2. The exporter adopts the SAE strategy and chooses the host-preferred variety as 
Proposition 2.1' is essentially identical to Proposition 2.1, and the proof is also 
the same to that for Proposition 2.1 ; only the critical values of êfower and Vj are 
changed. Therefore, interpretation of Proposition 2.1' is the same as that of Proposition 
platform. 
its platform if du < 0"mer and the home and the host countries have high 
cultural similarity. 
3. If 0 U  g , ( a ~ c ) / 2 b  , the exporter adopts the LAE strategy. 
where 
2.1. 
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Proposition 2.2': 
Assume N K >  1. The smaller is the variance of the uncertain preference in the host 
country, the higher is the fixed R&D cost, or the larger is the host market, the larger the 
range of 9U such that the exporter chooses to adopt the SAE strategy. 
Proof: 
Proposition 2.2' can be verified by differentiating 9"ower with respect to s, Nn and 
N K :  
26 
(a-c)(2-e#J 
^ ( a - c ) 2 ( 2 - s N K ) - \ 6 A N l  
< 0  
_ 44 
9K 
-J(a-c) ( 2 - e N K )  
> 0  
-161K 
(a-c) 
2 b  
( a - c ) ( 2 - s N K )  
^ j ( a - c ) 2 ( 2 - s N K ) - l 6 A V l  
> 0 .  QED 
Note that the first two arguments in Proposition 2.2 also hold here, but the third 
argument doesn't hold anymore. The intuitions behind the first two arguments in 
Proposition 2.2' are the same as that for Proposition 2.2. If s becomes smaller, the 
exporter faces less risk about incorrectly guessing the host-preferred variety, and the 
exporter prefers the SAE strategy. If the fixed R&D cost becomes higher, the exporter is 
more likely to adopt the SAE strategy to reduce the R&D cost. To understand the third 
argument, notice that the marginal cost in the host country is always the base marginal 
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cost. Since the larger size of the host market means that the home country becomes 
relatively smaller and less important for the exporter, the exporter is less likely to 
develop the variety tailored to the home country (LAE strategy). 
Multinational 
Suppose the firm becomes a multinational and adopts the S A  strategy. Since the 
multinational can observe the true preferred variety in the host country, the joint profit of 
the firm is: 
The first and second terms in the profit expression are the profits earned in the home and 
host countries, respectively. From the convexity of the profit structure, the optimal 
platform is 9U or QK . 
Proposition 2.7: 
Suppose a multinational adopts the S A  strategy. 
1. If Nk > 1, the multinational chooses the host-preferred variety as its platform. 
2. If Nk < 1, the multinational chooses its home-preferred variety as its platform. 
Proof: 
Given the monopoly profit with the S A  strategy, this follows from the comparison of 
and QED 
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Like the SAE strategy, Proposition 2.7 suggests that, when the multinational 
adopts the SA strategy, the multinational uses the preferred variety in the larger market as 
its platform variety to reduce the marginal cost and earn higher profit in the larger 
market. 
Now consider the case in which the multinational adopts the F L  strategy. Since 
the multinational develops two platforms tailored to two markets, the firm earns the 
usual monopoly profits in each market. 
7 1  FL N .  (*-c) +Tlr("-c) -2% 
4 A  '  ' 4 , 1  
Given i54 and nFL, the multinational's optimal production method is the strategy that 
provides the higher profit. Note that, if NK < 1, the optimal platform for the SA strategy 
is the home-preferred variety and the choice of the multinational is identical to that in 
t h e  m o d e l  w i t h  g i v e n  p l a t f o r m .  T h e r e f o r e ,  P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 3  h o l d s  h e r e .  W h e n  N K  >  1 ,  
Proposition 2.3 needs to be modified. 
Proposition 2.3': 
Assume N K > \ .  Suppose the monopoly profits of the multinational in the home and the 
host countries are positive. 
Given the revealed 0K , 
1. The multinational adopts the S A  strategy and chooses the host-preferred variety 
a s  i t s  p l a t f o r m  i f  d { d u  , d K ^ <  d .  
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2. The multinational adopts the F L  strategy if d [ o u , d K ^ > d .  
Where d  =  ^ a - c  - y j ( a  -c)2 - 4 A V j  1.  
The proof and interpretation of this proposition is essentially the same as that of 
Proposition 2.3. If the home and the host countries have similar cultures, the 
multinational adopts the SAE strategy because the adjustment cost is relatively 
inexpensive. Otherwise, the LAE strategy is the more favorable choice for the 
multinational because developing the additional platform is relatively cheaper than 
adjusting a platform. 
Since d  doesn't depend on N K , Proposition 2.4 doesn't hold anymore. That is, 
when Nk>\, the choice of the multinational between the SA and the LE strategies are 
the choice of the efficient technology in the home market, which is independent of the 
size of the host market. 
Optimal Choice of Location and Platform 
When N k <  1, the expected profits of the exporter and the multinational are the 
same as those in the model with a given platform; therefore, Proposition 2.5 holds. 
However, when NK > 1, the choice of the firm is slightly changed since the profits with 
the SAE and the SA strategies are different in this model with the endogenous platform. 
When Nk> 1, the expected profit is: 
If #"<<?/(l + e), 
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i 
121 
^ ( a - c f -Vi-EK 
I f  J / ( l  +  g )<^<J / ( l - e )  
\2 \ 
1 
2gg" 
1 
1261 
(*-c) 
41 
-V, ((1 + s)- J) + 
^-|(a-c-6(l-e)^y -(a-c-6J)'j] + ^ (a-c)' -1^ -E^ 
I f  a"><? / ( l - f ) ,  
E^ .MNE ,  l  +  N r  
41 
( a - c )  - 2 V i  - Ek  
Given En^, EnEXP = max \jLnSAE, En^ J, the firm chooses its best 
locational strategy. 
Proposition 2.5': 
N „  Assume N K > \ .  Suppose E K < —-(a-c) ( 6 - s ) e .  
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1. There exist 9%wer eld/(\ + e),(a-c)/2b~\ such that the firm becomes an 
exporter if <9" 
2. There exist 0 " p p e r e [ d / ( l  +  e ) , ( a - c ) / 2 b ^  such that the firm becomes a 
multinational if 0" > 0'u'ppar. 
Corollary 2.5.1': 
33 
Assume N K > 1 .  When E K  <  — ^K£bd 
12A(l-g)' 
and ë[;pper such that 0 ^  e [ d / ( l  +  e ) ,  d / { \ - e ) ]  and 0 v u p p e r  e \ d  !  { \  + s ) , d  !  { \ - e ) \ .  
The proofs of Proposition 2.5' and Corollary 2.5.1 ' are the same as those of 
Proposition 2.5 and Corollary 2.5.1. Like Proposition 2.5, this proposition suggests that 
the firm becomes a multinational if the host and the home countries have considerably 
different culture. When two countries have high cultural similarity, the firm is more 
likely to become an exporter. Moreover, if the host country has very similar culture with 
the home country, the SAE strategy is more favorable for the exporter. Assuming NK > 1, 
the platform for the SAE strategy is the host-preferred variety. 
Welfare of the home country 
Assuming N K > \ ,  the firm always serves the host country with the base 
marginal cost and the firm's decision on the technology and location doesn't affect the 
consumer welfare in the host country. However, consumer welfare in the home country 
depends on the firm's decision. The order of consumer welfare in the home country is: 
^ 
3 ( a - c ) ( l - s ) - s b d  , there exist 
where W ' v  is consumer welfare in home country U .  Similar with consumer welfare 
analysis in the model with given platform, the multinational strategy could harm 
consumer welfare in the home country and Corollary 2.5.2' follows. 
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Corollary 2.5.2': 
Assume A^>1 and EK <—^Ksbd .Allowing a 
multinational reduces consumer welfare in home country if 6" e Ô'upper, d /(l - s) and 
t r u e  6 K  < d - 0 u .  
Clearly, when NK < 1, Corollary 2.5.2 holds. The comparison of Corollaries 
2.5.2 and 2.5.2' suggests that the country with the smaller market could be worse-off 
from the cultural dissimilarity and allowing a multinational strategy for some ranges of 
9U and dK . Furthermore, Corollary 2.5.2' shows that even the home country could be 
worse-off if it has a smaller market than the host country; that is, cultural dissimilarity 
harms the (smaller) home country but helps the (larger) host country. 
Corollary 2.5.3' 
Assuming NK > 1. The home country will be better off if the home and the host country 
have sufficiently dissimilar culture. 
When two countries have similar culture, the exporter or the multinational is 
more likely to adopt the SA or SAE strategy. Furthermore, ifvVA, > 1, the platform of a 
firm is the host-preferred variety because the host market is larger and hence more 
important for the firm. Therefore, the additional adjustment cost is imposed on the 
consumers in the home country. 
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Conclusion 
As Dunning (1998) mentioned, different culture in any country provides the 
firm an incentive to establish its affiliate in that country because the multinational can 
access this different cultural framework and the cultural-specific consumer demands and 
preferences. This chapter of the dissertation develops a theoretic model of a monopolist 
to support his assertion using Lancaster-type preference. In addition, several surveys 
show that the dominant production strategy of multinationals is that they develop 
standardized and locally adjustable product (Kang, et al, 2002; Kang, et al, 2003; Kang, 
et al, 2004). This production strategy was discussed in the literature on the flexible 
technology (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994; Norman and Thisse, 1999; Norman, 2002) but 
was neglected in the literature on multinationals. The model introduced this strategy to 
allow the firm to reduce R&D cost by developing fewer varieties to serve different tastes 
in different countries. In the model with two countries, this strategy can be considered as 
a standardization strategy because the firm develops a standardized platform for 
adjustment. The alternative production strategy in the model is a localization strategy 
under which the firm develops a fully localized variety to satisfy a specific preference in 
the host country. 
This chapter shows that the exporter or the multinational adopts the 
standardization strategy if the home and the host countries have similar culture. The 
similar culture in both countries means the firm will have low adjustment cost. If the 
cultural difference between two countries is considerably larger, the localization strategy 
is the optimal production strategy for the exporter or the multinational. The model also 
shows that the firm becomes a multinational when the host country has dissimilar culture, 
thereby supporting the assertion by Dunning. Assuming the platform for the 
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standardization strategy is given by the home-preferred variety (or, equivalently, the 
home market is larger than the host market), the model shows that the multinational 
strategy may harm the welfare in the host country because the localization strategy of the 
exporter provides higher consumer welfare in the host country than the standardization 
strategy of the multinational. However, assuming the firm enters the home and the host 
markets simultaneously and the home market is smaller than the host market, the 
multinational strategy of the firm could reduce welfare in the home country rather than 
the host country. In this case, the cultural difference harms the home country. 
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Chapter 3. Competition of Two Multinationals under Different 
Cultural Backgrounds 
Introduction 
The second chapter showed that the different culture in any country provides the 
firm an incentive to establish its affiliate in that country because the multinational can 
access the different cultural framework and the cultural-specific consumer demands and 
preference. The third chapter of this dissertation will discuss another common argument 
for the influence of cultural differences on firms; that is, multinationals from one country 
may have an intrinsic advantage over multinationals from another country in foreign 
countries that are culturally similar to their own country (Caves, 1996; UNCTAD World 
Investment Report, 1998). For this purpose, the monopoly model used in the second 
chapter will be extended to a duopoly model. I consider two multinationals that are from 
two different home countries that have different cultures; therefore, one firm possesses 
an intrinsic advantage in adjustment costs over the other. They are assumed to supply 
their home country and are considering entering the host market; that is, the platform for 
the SA strategy is given as the firms' home-preferred variety.11 In this situation, this 
chapter studies, using the technology developed in the second chapter, the optimal 
production strategy of two multinationals from two countries that have different cultures. 
Also, the profits of the two firms in the host country, the effect of the cultural difference 
on the firms' optimal choice, and the welfare in the host country are discussed. 
11 This assumption will be relaxed in the fourth chapter. 
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Model 
Assume that there are two multinationals, one (labeled U )  from home country U  
and another (labeled J) from home country J. Assume host country K is more culturally 
similar to home country J. Finally, consider the situation that these two multinationals 
are considering entering the host country. 
Consider the same preference structure as was used with the monopoly model in 
the second chapter. Assume a representative consumer in country i has the following 
d e m a n d  f o r  a  p r o d u c t  o f  v a r i e t y  d j  t h a t  i s  s u p p l i e d  b y  f i r m  j :  
where { a ,  7, A )  are positive parameters and 6 '  is the ideally preferred variety in 
country i. p\ and <7/ are the price and the quantity demanded for the variety <9/ 
where Q t  represent total sales of all varieties and N ;  represents the number of 
c o n s u m e r s  i n  c o u n t r y  i .  
Turning to the firms, assume there are two multinationals, J  and U ,  which are 
P I  = a  
respectively. Then the aggregate demand for 6 j  is given by12: 
12 At equilibrium a demand of a representative consumer satisfies the following condition: 
m i n  p j  + y d ( d f , 0 ' } , p "  +  y d ( 0 " , d ' }  = a - A q t  
From this condition, the aggregate demand can be derived. 
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considering entering the host market. Each is currently a monopolist in its home market 
and produces a home-preferred variety, 6V for the firm in home country U and 6 ' for 
the firm in home country J. Assume that the preferred variety 0K in the host country is 
common knowledge for both multinationals and there is no demand uncertainty. The 
technology of firms follows that in the second chapter. If multinational i decides to enter 
t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y ,  i t  i n c u r s  a  f i x e d  e n t r y  c o s t  a n d  h a s  t w o  p r o d u c t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s ,  S A  
and FL. Assuming b < y, using the SA strategy, a multinational can produce 9K by 
adjusting its current home-preferred variety with additional marginal cost13. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  w i t h  t h e  F L  s t r a t e g y ,  a  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c a n  d e v e l o p  a  n e w  p l a t f o r m  6 K  
directly at a fixed R&D cost Vt without additional marginal cost. The total cost 
structure of a multinational h to produce 0K is: 
strategy: TCf = (c* + 6^ ^ 
FZ strategy: 7^=^+2*+%, 
where Q h K  is total sales of a variety 0 K  produced by the multinational h. Assume the 
two multinationals have the same base marginal cost. Finally, to focus the strategic 
interaction between the two multinationals, assume that the duopoly profit of 
multinationals is always positive. 
Assumption 1: c J = c u = c ,  d J  < d u ,  E J < E U ,  and V J < V U  where d h  = \ d h  - 6 K \ ,  
13 Following the technology in the second chapter, adjusting a platform QP to another variety requires 
a d d i t i o n a l  m a r g i n a l  c o s t :  b \ 9 P  — 9 J \  
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Assumption 2: Duopoly profit of a multinational is always positive, and multinationals 
U and J enter the host market. 
Strategic Interaction 
Assuming the entry of both firms, the two multinationals play the game with the 
f o l l o w i n g  s e q u e n c e  i n  h o s t  c o u n t r y  K :  
1. Given the entry of both firms, each firm decides its optimal production strategy; 
whether to adjust its current home-preferred platform 6h or to develop a new 
p l a t f o r m  0 K  t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  h o s t  m a r k e t  a t  a  f i x e d  R & D  c o s t  V h ,  h  =  J , U  .  
2. Given the prior stage decision, each firm simultaneously chooses its output. 
The duopoly profit matrix for this game is: 
Firm J/Firm U FL 
(^SA.SA ~ Ej » 71 SA,SA ~^u) {^SA.FL ~ Ej ' nSA,FL ~ ^ jj ) 
FL FL.SA ~ Ej , 7tFLiSA —EL/ ) {^FL,FL ~ Ej ' nFL,FL ~ ) 
where n h x  represent the profit of firm h  -  exclusive of entry cost - if firm J  and firm U  
adopt the strategies x and y respectively, h = J,U, x and y - SA, FL . The profit 
structures of the firms in each equilibrium are shown in table 4 in the appendix. 
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Given the profit structure, the firm's optimal choice of strategy depends on its 
fixed R&D cost. Hence: 
^46^%^ 
91 ( a - c - b d
u y ,  
and V x  -  V 2  91 > 0  
^ 46^^ ^  
91 
ka-c-MJ); 
and V3-V4 = 
r 4 b 2 d u d J N K A  
91 > 0  
Given the cost structure, V l  >  V 2  and V 3 > V 4 .  Also, given d J  >  d u ,  V 3  <  V l  and 
V4<V2. However, the ordering of V2 and V3 is ambiguous. Figure 114 shows the 
pattern of the equilibrium, assuming zero entry cost. 
When V I ;  >  V t , the S A  strategy is a dominant strategy for firm U .  When V u  <  V 2 ,  
the dominant strategy of firm U  is the F L  strategy. Otherwise, for V v  e ( V 2 , V l ) ,  firm U  
can chooses either the S A  or the F L  strategy depending on firm J's choice of the strategy; 
if firm J adopts the SA strategy, then firm U responds to firm J by using the FL strategy. 
14 All figures are in the appendix. 
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Vice versa, if firm J uses the F L  strategy, firm U  responds by adopting the S A  strategy. 
In general, when the fixed R&D cost is sufficiently low, firm U is more likely to adopt 
the FL strategy since developing a new localized platform costs less; when the fixed 
R&D cost is high, the SA strategy is more favorable strategy for firm U. The strategy 
choice of firm J is similar. Note that there exist multiple equilibria if Vu e (V2, V} ) and 
Equilibrium of the duopoly game and the cultural similarity of three countries 
Simple comparative statics of Vt, / = 1,2,3,4 show the effect of the culture on 
the strategic choice of firms and the equilibrium of duopoly game. 
Proposition 3.1: 
Let assumption 2 hold. Given d k  ( k  - J , U ) ,  
As d h  ( h  =  J , U ,  h ^ k )  increases (or decreases): 
1. The range of V h  in which the F L  strategy is the dominant strategy of firm h  
becomes larger (smaller). 
2. The ranges of V h  and V k  in which the S A  strategy is the dominant strategy of 
firm h and k become smaller (or larger). 
3. The range of V h  and V k  for which there exist multiple equilibria also becomes 
larger (or smaller). 
Proof: 
The first and third statements follow from assumption 2 and the functional property of 
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'=1,2,3,4: 
^r = ^ ^(o-c + 6^-2W)>0, 
a<f 91 ^ / 
9K 46AT, 
9^ 91 
( a - c  +  2 b d u ^ >  0 ,  
9K 46V'M 
5 d  ' ~  irL>0'an i  ^ =(H 
0 ,  ^ L - O ,  ^ ( M t H ' . 1 H ' ) > 0 l  
d d  91 9i 
and -—•= { a - c  +  2 b d J \ > §  
9^' 91 ^ / 
Note that the area for the multiple eqilibria is: 
A r e a ^ D )  =  
91 
and -^—Area{D)> 0, i  =  J , U .  
Therefore, the second and the third statements also hold. QED 
Proposition 3.1 suggests that, when a multinational h  has the cultural 
unfamiliarity in the host country, developing a new localized platform is more likely to 
be a dominant strategy of that firm; the R&D cost to develop an additional platform is 
r e l a t i v e l y  c h e a p e r  f o r  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  h  t h a n  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  f o r  t h e  S A  
strategy. Since the FL strategy chosen by firm h reduces its marginal cost in the host 
country, firm k, k^h, also is more likely adopt the FL strategy to prevent the loss of 
the market share in the host country; that is, the SA strategy is less likely to be a 
dominant strategy of firm k. Overall, if the two firms have more asymmetric cultural 
b a c k g r o u n d s ,  t h e  f i r m  f r o m  t h e  c u l t u r a l l y  s i m i l a r  c o u n t r y  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  a d o p t  t h e  S A  
strategy while the FL strategy is more likely to be adopted by the firm from the 
culturally dissimilar country; the former firm has more advantage using the adjustment 
technology than the latter firm. In addition, the optimal strategy of firm k depends more 
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on the strategic choice of firm h ,  and the area for multiple equilibria becomes larger. 
Assuming Vj = Vu = V, the equilibrium lines on the 45 degree line. Figure 1 
shows that, when the R&D cost is low, the equilibrium of the game is (FL, FL): as the 
R&D cost increases, an asymmetric equilibrium occurs; when the R&D cost is very high, 
both firms adopt the SA strategy, and the equilibrium (SA, SA) is achieved. Further, 
Proposition 3.1 implies the following corollary. 
Corollary 3.1.1: 
Assume Vd = Vv = V . 
Given d J ,  as d u  increases (or decreases), 
1. The region of V for (FL, FL) is unchanged. 
2. The region of V for (FL, SA) becomes larger (or is reduced). 
3. The region of V for multiple equilibria and (SA, SA) are reduced (or become 
larger). 
Given d u  ,  as d J  increases (or decreases) 
4. The region of V for (FL, FL) and multiple equilibria become larger (or are 
reduced). 
5. The region of Vfor (FL, SA) and (SA, SA) is reduced (or becomes larger). 
Proof: 
Corollary 3.1.1 follows directly from Proposition 3.1 and the assumption of 
Vj = Vu = V . QED 
Corollary 3.1.1 is summarized in table 5. Given the cultural similarity of home 
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country J ,  as the home country becomes more culturally dissimilar with the host country, 
(FL, SA) becomes the more likely outcome of the game; multinational U prefers to adopt 
the FL strategy because the SA strategy requires higher adjustment costs. For the same 
reason, the equilibrium (SA, SA) is less likely to be achieved. Since firm J has more 
advantage using the adjustment cost, the possibility of multiple equilibira decreases. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  g i v e n  d u ,  a s  f i r m / b e c o m e s  l e s s  c u l t u r a l l y  f a m i l i a r  t o  t h e  h o s t  m a r k e t ,  f i r m  J  
has more incentive to choose the FL strategy, and equilibrium (FL, FL) is more likely to 
emerge. Because the two firms have more similar cultural backgrounds, the possibility 
of the asymmetric outcome (FL, SA) is reduced, but multiple equilibria emerge with 
more possibility. Further, (SA, SA) is less likely to be achieved because firm J also has 
greater likelihood. In addition, from Corollary 3.1.1, Corollary 3.1.2 is derived. 
Corollary 3.1.2: 
Assuming d J  < d u ,  
1. As d J  and d u  increases, the region for the equilibrium ( F L ,  F L )  becomes 
larger, but that for (SA, SA) is reduced. 
2. As d J  and d u  decreases, the region for the equilibrium ( F L ,  F L )  becomes 
smaller, but that for (SA, SA) becomes larger. 
3. As d J  increases and d "  decreases, that is, they become closer, the region for 
( F L ,  F L )  a n d  m u l t i p l e  e q u i l i r i a  b e c o m e  l a r g e r ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  r e g i o n  f o r  ( S A ,  F L )  
is reduced. 
4. As d J  decreases and d "  increases, that is, they become further, the region for 
( F L ,  F L )  a n d  m u l t i p l e  e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  r e d u c e d ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  r e g i o n  f o r  ( S A ,  F L )  
becomes larger. 
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The proof for this corollary follows from Corollary 3.1.1. The intuition behind 
Corollary 3.1.2 is the same as that for Corollary 3.1.1. Moreover, Proposition 3.1.2 
suggests that, when the two home countries have similar culturals, the game has multiple 
equilibria with higher probability. That is, the strategy of one firm becomes more 
dependent on the other firm's strategy, but less on the marginal cost advantage. More 
cultural dissimilarity between the two home countries reduces the probability of multiple 
equilibira because firm J has considerably more advantage in the adjustment cost over 
its competitor and is less likely to adopt the FL strategy. Corollary 3.1.2 is summarized 
in table 6. 
Profit of firms under the different cultural backgrounds 
Using the cost assumption and the symmetry of the profit functions, the 
following relations hold for profits: 
nSA,FL > nFL,SA an<^ ^SA.SA ^  ^ SA.SA f° r  P K P i Kj ~ K/ 
7 1FL,FL — nFL,FL a n <^ nFL.SA ->  7 1SA,FL f° r  ^ r  P '  —Vj 
The equality in (FL, FL) holds if R&D costs are the same for the two firms ( V, : = V, ). 
Therefore, when both firms adopt the SA or FL strategy, that is, in a symmetric 
equilibrium, (SA, SA) or (FL, FL), firm J earns higher (no lower) profits than firm U, 
given Vj >Vj. Moreover, if (FL. SA) is the equilibrium, then the profit of firm J is 
higher than that of firm U: nJFL SA > nJSA SA > n,^SA > nFi,sA • The first and third 
inequalities follow from the best response of firm J and firm U respectively, while the 
second inequality is due to the cost advantage of firm J. 
However, when firm / adopts the SA strategy but firm U adopts the FL strategy, 
that is, the equilibrium (SA, FL), either firm can earn higher profit depending on dh 
and Vh, for h = J, U. 
Proposition 3.2: 
Assuming two firms J and U have identical base marginal costs, then firm U earns 
h i g h e r  p r o f i t  t h a n  f i r m  J  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i f  V u  <  m i n  V u , V l  ,  V U > V 4 ,  a n d  V 4  <  V ,  
where V v  = ( b d J N K / 3 A ) ( 2 a - 2 c - b d J ) .  
Proof: 
Assume the two firms have the same base marginal and zero entry costs: Es = Ev = 0. 
T h e  p r o f i t  o f  f i r m  U  c a n  b e  h i g h e r  t h a n  f i r m  J  o n l y  i f  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  ( S A ,  F L  ) .  
Suppose the equilibrium is (SA, FL) and the profit of firm U is higher than that of firm 
J, ^sa,fl - nÏA,Fi • This is true only if Vu < Vv =(bdJNK /3A)(2a-2c-bdJ) where 
Vi; is the fixed cost of firm U that makes nJSA FL = nvSA FL . Further, the equilibrium 
( S A ,  F L )  i s  a c h i e v e d  o n l y  w h e n  V ( l  <  V {  a n d  V 4  <  V f .  S i n c e  V t  >  V 4  a n d  V L ;  >  V j ,  
V u  s u c h  t h a t  V v  <  V i ;  e x i s t s  o n l y  i f  V v  >  V 4 .  N o t i c e  t h a t  V , ;  e x i s t s  f o r  a l l  d ' ,  
i-J,U, such that dJ <du. QED 
Proposition 3.2 suggest following. When the fixed R&D costs are not too high 
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for firm [/but high enough for firm J, the high adjustment costs for firm Umay lead it to 
develop a new platform with the fixed R&D cost, regardless of the choice by firm J. 
This decision makes firm J face the lower marginal cost of the competitor U and hence 
lowers the profits of firm J. 
Size of the foreign market and the equilibrium of the duopoly game 
Assume E, = Eu and V3 - Vv = V ; the equilibrium lies on the 45 degree line 
in figure 1. As the market size NK in the host country increases, critical values of Vi 
increases, i = 1,2,3,4. That is, the increase in NK has the same effect as shrinking the 
fixed cost V . If the host market is small, neither firm will develop the local platform. 
As the host market becomes larger, the more dissimilar multinational adopts the FL 
strategy first; that is, develops the local platform. When the host market becomes large 
enough, both firms adopt the SA strategy and adjust their current platform with 
additional adjustment costs. 
Assume the duopoly profit of a firm is positive. If the market size NK is very 
small, neither firm adopts the local platform: (SA, SA). Clearly firm J earns higher 
profit than the competitor. As the market size grows, the equilibrium moves to G; 
(SA, FL), then more dissimilar multinational U adopts the FL strategy first; that is, 
develops the local platform. Moreover, if V4 <V < min Vh,, Vx is satisfied, firm U even 
earns higher profit than firm J. As the market size grows more, D becomes the 
equilibrium, and multiple equilibria, (SA,FL) and (FL, SA), emerges. In this situation, 
either firm can earn higher profits than its competitor. As NK grows even more, the 
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equilibrium moves to C and the unique equilibrium (SA,FL) is achieved again. Firm U 
can earn higher profit than firm J if Proposition 3.2 holds. Finally, if the market size in 
the host country is very large, both firms adopt the local variety to serve the host country, 
and firm T s profit is higher (no lower) than firm IT s profit. 
Welfare of the host country 
The welfare in the host country is largest when both firms adopt the local variety 
and lowest in the equilibrium (5/1, SA) . The size of welfare in the host country is 
ordered as: 
FF (FI, FI) > IP (&4, Fl) > PP (FI, &4) > (&4, &4) 
where W  (/', j ) is the welfare in the equilibrium (z, j ) ,  i ,  j  =  S A ,  F L  .  
From Proposition 3.1, the order of the welfare in the host country suggests that, 
when both home countries have considerably different culture from the host country, 
both firms adopt the FL strategy and the welfare in the host country is highest. This 
occurs since both firms develop the local platform and reduce the marginal cost, and 
hence price, in the host market. However, if both multinationals come from the home 
countries that are culturally similar with the host country, the equilibrium (SA, SA) is 
achieved, and the welfare of host country is lowest. From the perspective of the host 
country, entry of the unfamiliar firms can be better because these firms choose the 
localization strategy.15 
15 Notice that, as du increases, welfare in host country will go down if firm U  adopts the SA strategy. 
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Assume Ej = Ev and V; = Vv ; then equilibrium lies on the 45 degree line in 
figure 1. The welfare structure in the host country suggests the following. As the fixed 
R&D cost V increases or the NK decreases, the equilibrium moves toward the area I, 
and the welfare in the host country is reduced. From the perspective of the host country, 
a policy that reduces the firms' fixed R&D cost V can encourage the multinational to 
develop the local variety, and this may increase the welfare. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed one common belief for the effect of culture on 
multinationals; multinationals from the country that is culturally similar to the host 
country may have an intrinsic advantage over multinationals from another country 
(Caves, 1996; UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1998). For this purpose, the model of 
a monopolist in the second chapter is expended to a duopoly situation where there are 
two multinationals from two different home countries. Multinationals in this chapter are 
assumed to supply their home country and consider entering the host market; the 
platform for the SA strategy is given the firms' home-preferred variety. Under these 
assumptions and using the technology developed in the second chapter, this chapter 
studies the optimal production strategy of the two multinationals. Profits of the two firms, 
the effect of the cultural difference on the firms' optimal choice, and the welfare in the 
host country are also discussed. 
The duopoly model assumes that the multinational, call it J, from the home 
country that is culturally similar to the host country has an advantage in the adjustment 
cost; firm Jean adjust its home-preferred variety with lower marginal adjustment cost 
Welfare will decreases until firm U  will adopt the FL strategy and will be recovered in the new 
equilibrium. 
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than firm U. When both home countries have considerably different cultures (or 
preferences) from the host country, both multinationals are more likely to adopt the FL 
strategy. If two home countries have similar cultures with the host country, both firms 
adjust their home-preferred variety to serve host market. Furthermore, when cultural 
backgrounds of two multinationals are considerably different from each other, the 
asymmetric equilibrium is more likely to appear; firm J, which has an advantage in the 
adjustment cost, may adopt the SA strategy, but the FL strategy becomes the more 
favorable choice of firm U. If both home countries have similar cultural backgrounds, 
the symmetric equilibrium becomes the more possible outcome; the possibility of 
multiple equilibria also increases. 
Another suggestion of duopoly game is that, although firm Jhas an intrinsic cost 
advantage over firm U, the strategic interaction of the two multinationals could allow 
firm U, from the culturally dissimilar country, to earn higher profit in the host country. 
Thus, cultural similarity of firm J may turn out to be a strategy disadvantage. In detail, 
when the fixed R&D costs are not too high for firm U but high enough for firm J, firm U 
may adopt the FL strategy because of the high adjustment costs, but firm J adjusts its 
home-preferred variety to serve the host country. In this situation, the marginal cost of 
firm J is higher than that of firm U, and firm U can earn higher profit than firm J. 
The size of the host market affects the decision of multinationals; as the host 
market becomes larger, multinationals are more likely to develop a localized platform to 
earn higher profit in host market. In terms of consumer welfare in the host country, the 
SA strategy reduces the welfare (compared to the FL strategy) because the marginal cost 
in the host country increases. As R&D cost of both firms increases, the equilibrium of 
the duopoly game moves from (FL, FL) to (SA, SA) via the asymmetric equilibrium (SA, 
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F L )  or ( F L ,  S A ) ,  reducing the consumer welfare in the host country. 
Chapter 4. Duopoly Model with Endogenous Choice of the Platform 
Variety: Role of the Size of Markets 
Introduction 
The third chapter assumed the initial platform varieties of the two multinationals 
for the SA strategy was given. In this chapter, I will relax that assumption and allow the 
firm to choose its platform if it uses the SA strategy. 
In this chapter, I consider a situation in which demand for a new product 
emerges in the home and the host countries. Further, two multinationals in two different 
home countries have their production facility in their home countries and consider 
entering the home and host market simultaneously. In this situation, the size of the home 
markets plays a major role in the firms' choice of platform for the SA strategy. Briefly 
speaking, if a firm has a (relatively) large home market, the firm is more likely to use its 
home-preferred variety as its platform for the SA strategy. This enables the firm to earn 
higher profit from the larger home market, even though the profit in the smaller host 
country is reduced. Conversely, when the host market is large, the firm's platform for the 
SA strategy is likely to be the host-preferred variety. Thus, the relative size of the two 
home markets affects the firms' choices of platform. A firm from a relatively large 
country may adopt the FL strategy or uses its home-preferred variety as its platform for 
the SA strategy, while a firm from a relatively small country is more likely to adopt the 
SA strategy using the host-preferred platform. If all three countries are of similar size, 
the firm's choice of platform depends more on the competitor's strategy, and there is a 
possibility for multiple equilibria to exist. Furthermore, it is possible that a less efficient 
outcome emerges. In addition, this chapter studies the welfare of each country at the 
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equilibrium, as dependent on the sizes of the three countries. 
Model 
Assume that two multinationals have the same technology as in the third chapter. 
Assume that each firm is the sole supplier in its home country, and that monopoly profit 
is always positive. Further, assume that the duopoly profit in the host country is also 
positive, and both firms always enter the host market. Each firm can have two 
production strategies: the SA strategy or the FL strategy as in the duopoly model in the 
third chapter. Flowever, when it adopts the SA strategy, the firm can choose which 
platform to utilize. 
Turing to demand, I assume that the multinational faces the following inverse 
demand for the variety 6{ in country i supplied by firm j, which was discussed before. 
where 9' is the ideally preferred variety in country i and Nt is the market size in 
country j. Other assumptions of the duopoly model in the third chapter still hold in this 
chapter. 
Both multinational U  and J  have the strategy set S '  =  j F L ,  S A ^ t f '  ) j ,  i  =  J , U ,  
where 9-' is the platform variety that firm i chooses. Given entry of both firms, the 
game is played in the following sequence: 
1. The two multinationals choose their optimal production strategy s '  e S ' ,  
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2. Given the optimal production strategy that was chosen in the first stage, if a 
multinational i adopts SA{0^) strategy, then firm i chooses the optimal 
platform variety 6f. 
3. Given the prior stage decision, each firm chooses its output. 
Thus, a multinational chooses the number of platforms to develop in the first 
stage. In the second stage, the firm develops this (these) platform(s) using the firm's 
information on markets and the competitor's strategy. The idea behind this sequence is 
that, even if the firm chooses the number of platforms and the prototype of the platform 
simultaneously, the platform can be changed during the R&D process, responding to the 
competitor's strategy or additional market information. However, irreversible investment 
to construct the production facility to produce multi-platforms cannot be changed once 
the investment decision is made. Assuming b < y, firm j supplies only the ideally 
preferred variety to country I :  6 '  -  6 ' .  Finally, assume that the assumptions 1 and 2 in 
chapter three hold here. 
Strategic Interaction 
From the given sequence of decisions, the two multinationals play a two-stage. 
The equilibrium output in this duopoly game can be studied by backward solution. 
Assuming the entry of both multinationals, the profit matrix in the first stage game is as 
follows. Notice that profits with the SA strategy depends on the choice of platform in the 
second stage. 
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Firm J/firm U FL 
FL (j^FL.FL ~ Ej, ÏÏFL FL ~-Ey) 1 
V
 
c*
T i 3 
( j*SA,FL ~~ Ej , 71S A,FL ~~ ) {^SA.SA Ej'^SA.SA ) 
where n h x y  represents the profits of firm h  -  exclusive of entry cost - if firms J and U  
adopt the strategies x and y respectively, h = J,U, x and y = SA, FL . If either firm 
chooses the SA strategy, the two firms play the subgame to choose platform in the 
second stage. Therefore, except for the equilibrium {FL, FL), the profits of the two 
multinationals are a function of the platforms that are chosen in the next stage16. 
Suppose both multinationals enter the markets by developing two localized 
varieties (the FL strategy). The joint profits of multinational i, i = J,U - exclusive of 
entry cost - is: 
-
2rr. J = J,U, •*] 
If multinational J enters by developing only one platform variety (the SA 
strategy), but multinational U adopts the FL strategy, the joint profits of firms J and L'­
exclusive of entry cost - are: 
x L . r i  ( 0 j )  =  ^ j ( a ~ C ~  b d P J ' J  )  + ~ ^ { a ~ 2 { c  +  b d P J K )  +  c ]  ~ V J  
16 Even in the FL strategy, platforms are chosen in second stage. However, the optimal strategy is always 
to choose the ideal variety for each country, so there is no strategic aspect to these choices. 
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^SA.FL [ôj )~~^(a~C) + "^7 (a ™ 2c + (C + bdPJ'K )) 9A •2V,, 
where d •' = \9j - 9' |, i = J,K. Firm J's optimal choice of platform variety is 6  or 
9J, depending on the relative market size of the home country. The choice of platform 
strategy and the joint profits of the two multinationals - exclusive of entry cost - are: 
I f  >  0 - / ,  t h e n  ^  a n d  
n J S A , F L { 9 J ) - - ^ { a - C )  +^y(a"C"2MJ) ~VJ 9A 
7t SA,FL 9A 
If N, < Nk  , then 9', = 9K and 
n SA,FL 9A 
n. SA,FL ( f f * ) ^ { a - c f + ? f ( a - c ) ' - 2 F „  9A 
where &J = — 9 
V 
a - 2c' + cJ - bd' 
2  { a - c ' ) - b d '  
16 
9 
a - c -  b d '  
2 ( a - c ) - b d '  h  j - J , U .  
Similarly, the optimal platform variety and the joint profits of the two 
multinationals in (FL, SA) - exclusive of entry cost - are: 
If ATy > , then ^ and 
7rra,^(6,U) = ^j(<3-c) +~^{a~c + bdU) ~2Vj 
58 
7 r F L , s A { & U )  - ~ j j ( a - c )  + - ^ j ( a - c ~ 2 b d U )  - V v  
If ^ , then ^ and 
nFL,SA [ d K )=^{ a~C~ b d" ) +~9^~(°~C )  ~V u  
If (FL, SA) or (SA, FL) is the choice in the first stage, a multinational that adopts 
the SA strategy plays a sub-game to choose its optimal platform in the second stage. The 
multinational i chooses the home-preferred platform 9' as the platform variety if the 
home market is large enough. The optimal platform variety of multinational i is 6' if 
N, > &jNk , i, j = J,U, i ^ j ; otherwise, 0K is the optimal platform variety of firm 
i. 
Finally, suppose (SA, SA) is chosen in the first stage. In this case, the two 
multinationals play a sub-game to choose their optimal platform variety. Profits of 
multinational i in (SA, SA) - exclusive of entry cost - are: 
x' sam [ d J  b d F ' J  )  + ~ [ a - 2 { c  +  b d p ' ' K )  +  { c  +  b d F j ' K ^  - V i  
where i  =  J , U ,  j  =  J , U , and i  ^  j .  Due to the convexity of the profit function in 
marginal cost, the profit-maximizing platform variety of firm i is & or 9K . 
Therefore, assuming entry into the host country is profitable for both firms, the 
profit matrix for the platform variety game in the second stage becomes: 
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Firm JI firm U eu eK 
eJ 
eK {*iA0K>0*)-'&Ae* •<>*)) 
The profits of the firms in each equilibrium are shown in table 7. 
Given the profit structure, the firm's choice of platform variety depends on the 
market size of the home country, and we obtain the following relations: 
"Lm K  •  a  K •e " ) «  * < s  N , - •&J"-N* 
1 6 ( a - c  +  b d J  - b d ' )  
where Q' J = — —^, i ,  j  =  J , U  .  Notice that /V, > N 2  and N 3 > N 4  .  
9 ( 2 ( a - c ) - b d ' )  
Also, given d u  >  d J , then M, > TV, and N 4 > N 2 .  Whenever N u  < N 2 ,  the choice 
of 0K is a dominant strategy (in this sub-game) for multinational IJ. Whenever 
Nr, > jV, , Ou is U's dominant strategy. For Nv e (N2,JV,), either 6lJ or 0K can 
be the platform variety chosen by firm U, depending on (its beliefs concerning) firm Js 
"  ^ -^=(16 /9 )  (w%/(2 (o -c ) -6^ ) )>0  and  
^ -# ,= ( l6 /9 ) - (w^ / (2 (a -c ) -6^ ) )>0  
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choice of platform variety. The strategic decision of firm J is similar. Figure 2 shows 
the pattern of the equilibrium of this sub-game. Notice that N2 < N4 < NK but the 
comparison of TV, and N 3  to N K  is ambiguous18. 
If both home countries' markets are considerably larger than the host country, 
the equilibrium of the sub-game to choose the optimal platforms is I: (dJ ,0U). If the 
market size in the two home countries are similar to each other and "comparable" in size 
to the host country, the equilibrium of the sub-game is D and multiple equilibria exist; 
(ûJ ,ÛK) and {0K ,du). If the markets of the two home countries are both 
considerably smaller than that of the host country, the equilibrium is in area A where 
both multinationals choose 0K as their platform variety. If one home country's 
market i is considerably larger than that of the host country, then a decrease in size of the 
other home market will lead to an equilibrium in which the multinational from the small 
home market chooses dK as its optimal platform variety, while the other multinational 
chooses its home variety as its platform.19 
Equilibrium of the Game and the Size of Markets 
As shown before, the equilibrium choice of platforms, when firms adopt the SA 
strategy, depends on the size of their home countries. In this section, I will examine all 
possible cases. 
Since both multinationals enter the home and host markets simultaneously, a 
18 We know N X < N 3 .  N i  <  N K  if ^ 2 ^ a - c - 2 b d J )  +  b { l d u  -12c/J)j > 0. The first term must 
b e  p o s i t i v e ;  t h u s ,  i f  d u  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e r  t h a n  d J ,  N x  <  N K  .  
19 Clearly, similar results would hold if each firm faced a competitor in its home market. This will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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comparison of the total profits of the two firms in the host and home countries has more 
meaning than the profit of the two firms in the host country. However, total profit of a 
firm depends on more the size of the home market than on the strategic interaction 
between the two firms. Therefore, I will focus analysis on the pattern of the duopoly 
equilibrium and the welfare issue rather than the profits of both firms. 
i. Nu > N ]  and NJ>N3: Area I 
First, consider the situation in which the two home countries have considerably 
larger markets than the host country, that is, Nu > Nt and Nj > /V3. This is area I in 
the figure 2. A multinational chooses its home-preferred platform 0 ' ,  i  =  J ,U, when it 
adopts the SA strategy. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in the first stage 
becomes: 
Firm J ! firm U FL 
FL ( nFL,FL '  nFL,FL )  
Notice that the duopoly game with the endogenous choice of platform variety 
here is the same as that in the third chapter that assumed the given initial platform of 
each multinational. Since the multinationals come from large home markets, they will 
adjust their home-preferred variety when they adopt the SA strategy. By doing so, they 
can earn high profit in their home countries which have large markets. The results of the 
analysis and the propositions/corollaries from the third chapter hold here. 
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The size of the consumer welfare in each country is ordered as: 
fF* (FI, FZ) > Fi) > (FZ, ) > ^ , 5^ ) 
W J  ( F L ,  F L )  =  W J  ( S A J  , F L )  =  W J  ( F L ,  S A U  )  =  W J  ( S A J ,  S A U  )  
^ (FZ, FI) = ^  , Fl) = ^ (FZ, ) = ^  ) 
where Wh (/, j) is the welfare at equilibrium (/, j) in country h, and the superscript of 
SA refers the firm's platform. Note that the SA strategy of multinationals does not change 
the welfare in their home country; their home markets are large enough, and they use 
their home-preferred variety as platforms. However, the SA strategy makes the host 
country worse-off because the host market is small. 
ii. Nu<N2 and Nj < N4 : Area A 
If both home countries are relatively small, that is, if Nu < N2 and N f  < N4, 
any firm that adopts the SA strategy uses the host-preferred variety as its platform. The 
firm can earn more profit from the larger market - host market - by using the host-
preferred variety as its platform. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in the first 
stage is: 
Firm JI firm U FL SA 
FL FL,FL '  nFL,FL ) (<«("*)•*«.*(»*)) 
SA ( < A 0 K ) ' " ^ A e K ) )  
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As in the previous case, given the profit structure, the firm's optimal choice of 
the strategy depends on its fixed R&D cost: 
Note that the order of V* and V3 is undetermined20. Figure 3 shows the pattern of the 
equilibrium, assuming zero entry cost. 
The pattern of the equilibrium is similar with case (i). When Vv < VA and 
Vj < V3 ', equilibrium (FL, FL) is achieved because both firms have low R&D costs. 
When Vv > Vf and Vj > V3, both firms adopt the SA strategy with platform 0K . 
Otherwise, the firm that has relatively low R&D cost uses the FL strategy. Further, the 
figure 3 shows that multiple equilibria never occur. Notice that both firms earn the 
constant operating profits in the host country in this case. Therefore, the choice of a 
firm's strategy depends on the profit in its home country, but doesn't depend on the 
20 From N ( j  < N 2 ,  V f  <  V 2  where V 2  is defined by ( A b d u N K  / 9 —  C  — bdU ) in the third 
chapter. Also V3 < V4 from Nj < N4 where V4 = ^4 bdJ NK !9X)(a-C — bdJ j . Therefore, if 
^ ^ «nee ^ . 
nFL,SA > 71 SA,SA iff K/ < ^ 3 
iff = 
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competitor's strategy since the competitor only chooses 0K for one platform. 
Remark: 
Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 hold except concerning the cases of multiple 
equilibria. 
The remark follows from the functional properties of V{4 and V3A : 
Turning to the welfare issue, the size of consumer welfare in each country is 
ordered as: 
fF* (FI, Fl) = ^  , Fl) = fP* (FZ, ) = PF* ) 
PT/ (FI, FI) = ^  (FI,) > ^  , Fl) = ^  ) 
^ (FI, FI) = PF^ , Fi) > PF^ (FI, = PF" ) 
The welfare in the relatively large host country is constant and high regardless of the 
equilibrium of the duopoly game since both firms always develop the host-preferred 
platform. However, each home country h, h-J,U, loses consumer welfare if 
multinational h adopts the SA strategy. The multinational(s) can increase its cost 
efficiency by adopting the SA strategy, but this choice results in a loss of consumer 
welfare in its home market, which is relatively small. 
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iii. Nu > N2 and N, < N4 : Areas B and E 
Suppose firm Jhas a relatively small home market, but the home market of U is 
not too small; Nv > N2 and Nj <N4. Then firm J uses the host-preferred variety as its 
platform when it adopts the SA strategy to earn higher profit from the host market. 
However, firm If s platform for the SA strategy is the home-preferred variety because 
home market U is large enough. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in the first 
stage becomes: 
Firm J1 firm U FL SA 
FL ( nFL,FL '  nFL,Fl .  )  
(" 'sA,Fl( 0 K ) ,""sAfL(0* )) t f " ) , 9 " ) )  
As in previous cases, the firms' choice of strategy follows the following rules: 
i# %; < ^ ^ " 
and iff 
Notice that V2BE > VBE =V2>V4> VJiE 22 Figure 4 shows the pattern of the equilibrium, 
2, 
2 2  V 4  >  V B E  comes from N j  <  N 4 .  
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assuming zero entry cost. 
The equilibrium pattern is similar with case (ii). Since the two multinationals 
have a more asymmetric structure, that is, more asymmetric home markets, the 
symmetric equilibrium becomes less likely as the outcome of the game. As in the case 
(ii), multiple equilibria do not exist in this range of Nt, i = J,U. Further, assuming 
V j  =  V f J ,  [ F L ,  S A u  ) never shows up. Notice that the critical values of the R&D costs 
have the following properties: 
55>o .  fSLo-  ^ -0 -  ^ >0 -  ^ =0 -  ^  
Therefore, Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 hold except the arguments for 
multiple equilibria. 
Now consider the size of consumer welfare in each country. They are ordered 
as: 
PF* (FZ, FZ) = PF* , Fl) > PF* (FI, ) = PF^ ) 
PF^ (FI, FI) - PT / (FI, 5^ ) > PF^ , Fl) = PF^ ) 
PF^ (Fi, FI) = PF^ , FZ,) = PF" (FZ, 5^ ) = PF^ ) 
Notice that home country U, which has a large market, has constant and maximum 
consumer welfare level for any equilibrium outcome. The host country, which is smaller 
than home country U, loses some welfare due to the SA strategy of firm U. However, the 
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SA strategy of firm J, which comes from a relatively small country, harms its home 
country but benefits the host country. 
iv. N r ,  <  N 2  and /V, > A,r4 : Areas C and F 
When firm [/has a small home market, but the home market of firm J is not too 
small, firm J uses its home-preferred variety as the platform for the SA strategy while 
firm LPs platform for the SA strategy is the host-preferred variety. This is just the reverse 
of the previous case. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix is: 
Firm J1 firm U FL 
FL FL,FL' nFL.FL) 
SA 
As usual, the firms' choice of strategy follows the following rule: 
and iff 
and ^ ^  i# K, < = ^  = K, 
The order of VtC1' and V3CF is undetermined23. The equilibrium pattern is same as that 
in case (ii) except for the critical values of Vf, i = J,U, and looks like figure 3. Like 
(ii), there do not exist multiple equilibria in this game. Since VtCF, z = 1,3, is non-
23 Since N v  < N 2 ,  V f F  <  V 2  .  However, the order of V{CF and V3CF is ambiguous. 
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decreasing in d h ,  h  =  J , U ,  Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 also hold here, 
except the arguments for multiple equilibria. 
Now consider the size of consumer welfare in each country. They are ordered 
as: 
PF* (FZ, FZ) - PF* (FZ, ) > PF* , FZ) = PF* (&4^, S/T ) 
PF^ (FZ, FZ) = PF^ FZ) = PF"' (FZ, ) = PF"' ) 
PF" (FZ, FZ) = PF" , FZ) > PF^ (FZ, ) = PF" ) 
Since home country J is large enough, the SA strategy of firm J doesn't reduce the 
welfare in its home country but decreases that in the host country. However, the SA 
strategy of firm U, which comes from a small country, harms its home country, but not 
the host country. 
v. N I ;  >  N t  and N 4  <  N ,  <  N 3  : Area H 
The fifth case is that home country [/has large market and home country Jhas a 
moderate size home market. In the asymmetric equilibrium, that is, (FL,SA) or 
( S A , F L ), a firm that adopts the S A  strategy uses its home-preferred variety as its 
platform. This is because the home market of the firm is not too small. However, when 
both firms adopt the SA strategy, firm J uses the host-preferred variety, but firm U uses 
its home-preferred variety as its platform since home market U is relatively larger than 
home market J. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in the first stage is: 
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Firm J i firm U FL 
FL FL.FL '  nFL,FL )  (<*K ),<„(»")) 
The firms' choice of strategy depends on the fixed R&D cost: 
n SA.FL i #  %/<%"  =  9À (2o-2c + 6(^-2^)) 
^><5 ,  if f  
iff ^ 
iff 
Notice that K," < ^  and ^>F,>^>^ for ^ and ^<^<Ar/\The 
pattern of equilibrium is similar with case (i), and looks like the figure 3.1 except critical 
values of Vn i = J,U. Like case (i), multiple equilibria can occur in area D (see figure 
3.1). Further, Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 hold because V" , i = 1,2,3,4, 
is non-decreasing in d h ,  h  =  J , U .  
The consumers' welfare in each countriy are ordered as: 
PF^ (FZ, FZ) > PF* , FZ) > PF* (f%, ) = PF* ) 
F;=(4W^/9A)L-c-6(^-^))  and ^=(4W%/9A)(a-c-&(^-^))  
from the chapter three. 
PF^ (FI, FZ) = PF^ (FZ, = PF^ (&4\ FZ) > PF^ (&4\ &T ) 
PF^ (FZ, FZ) = PF" (S^, FZ) = PF" (FZ, &4" ) = Pf ^  (&4^, &4" ) 
Because home country U is large, firm U chooses its home-preferred variety as its 
platform, and this choice reduces the welfare in the host country but not home country U. 
Since the size of home country J is moderate, the optimal platform of firm J depends on 
the strategy of firm U. If firm U adopts the FL strategy, 6J is the optimal platform for 
firm J because home market J is not too small. However, if firm U adopts the SA strategy, 
firm Jean earn higher duopoly profit in the host country by using the host-preferred 
variety as its platform because the marginal cost of firm U is relatively high. This 
additional profit in the host market overcomes the loss of firm J's profit in its home 
market J .  Therefore ( S A K , SA" ) reduces the welfare in home country J. 
vi. N 1 < N U <  and N ,  >  N 3  :  Area G 
Consider the case in which country J has a large market, but country [/has a 
moderate size home market. Like case (v), in asymmetric equilibrium (FL,SA) or 
( S A ,  F L ) , a firm that adopts the S A  strategy uses its home-preferred variety as its 
platform. However, in equilibrium (SA,SA), firm J uses its home-preferred variety, but 
firm U uses the host-preferred variety as their platforms because home country J is 
relatively larger than home country U. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in 
the first stage is: 
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Firm J / firm U FL 
FL FL,FL>nFL,Fh) (<=>"),<>")) 
(<Ft(eJ)-<™(sJ)) 
As before, given the profit structure, the firms' choice of strategy depends on 
their fixed R&D costs: 
iff 
iff = 
6(2^+^)^ 
u 
(2a-2c-6 (2^-^)) 
nFL,FL >  nSA,FL 
From V2  >V4 ,  V° > V4 a . However, the order of V° and V3 G  is undetermined. The 
equilibrium pattern is similar to case (i) or (v). Figure 3.1 shows the pattern of the 
equilibrium except for the critical values of Vi, i = J, U . The firms' decision rules 
suggest that multiple equilibria exist here. Moreover, Vf , j  = 1,2,3,4 is non-
decreasing in dh ,  h-J,U. Therefore, Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 still 
hold. 
Turning to the consumer welfare in three countries, the size of the welfare in 
each country is ordered as: 
PF* (FI, FI) > PF* (&4^, Fi) = PF^ (&4^, ) > PF^ (FI, &4^ ) 
PF^ (FI, FI) = ^  (FI, &4" ) = PF^ (&4\ Fi) = PF^ (&^, &4* ) 
PF" (FI, FI) = PF" (&4\ Fi) = PF" (FI, &4" ) > PF" (&4^, ) 
The large home market of J induces firm J to use its home-preferred variety as the 
platform; the welfare in home country J is constant and high, but host country loses 
some welfare. Since the size of home market U is moderate, the platform of firm U for 
the  SA s t ra tegy  i s  6U  i f  f i rm J adopts  the  FL s t ra tegy  or  0K  i f  f i rm J adopts  the  SA 
strategy. Therefore, the equilibrium (FL, SAu ) harms the host country, but doesn't 
affect on the consumer welfare in home country U. When the equilibrium is {SA J ,SAK^ j ,  
the SA strategy of firm /reduces the welfare of the host country, but the SA strategy of 
firm U doesn't influence consumers' welfare in the host country. 
vii. N 2  < Ny < N l  and N 4  < Nj  < N 3 :  Area D 
The last possible situation is that both home countries have moderate size of 
their home market. The two multinationals are highly symmetric, except for the cultural 
similarity. When one firm adopts the SA strategy, the firm uses its home-preferred 
variety as the platform because its home market is large enough. However, when both 
firms use the SA strategy, firms can choose either home-preferred variety or host-
preferred variety for their platform. The profit - exclusive of entry cost - matrix in the 
first stage can be expressed as: 
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FirmJ/firmU FL 
FL {^fl,fl ' nfl,fl ) 
where i  = J,K and j  = U ,K , / ^ j . Notice that the game is a mixture of cases (v) 
and (vi). 
Given the profit structure and analysis in (v) and (vi), the firm's rule for the 
optimal strategy is: 
if r„<r °=min[>l'>l0] = tf 
<rl < if = max[F,", 
<„ > iff < Pf = F," = =K,; Vf < F,° 
if >0<r3o=min[r,",lf] = K," 
if r,>F3"=max[F,",K3°] = ^ 
<Ft > <Ft iff Vj < K = y" = Ki° = C. 
Note that F," > V° and V? > V"  hold for N 2<NU  < N ]  and N a<NJ  <N 3 .  Clearly, 
V 2 d  > V 4 d  holds .  However ,  the  order  of  Vf and Vf i s  ambiguous .  The  order  of  V t D  
and V3d is also ambiguous. Figure 5 shows the pattern of equilibrium, assuming zero 
entry cost. 
The general pattern of equilibrium in figure 5 is similar to previous cases. When 
Vu  > V" , the SA strategy is a dominant strategy for firm U regardless of the firms' 
choice of platforms. When Vv  < V® , the dominant strategy of firm U is the FL strategy. 
In other cases, the strategy of firm U can be either the SA or FL strategy, depending on 
the competitor's strategy. Likewise, when Vj > Vf, the SA strategy is the optimal choice 
of firm J regardless of the other firm's choice of platforms. If V, < Vf, firm J always 
uses the FL strategy. Therefore, for Vi; < V" and Vj < Vf (Area A), (FL,FL) is the 
equilibrium of the duopoly game. For Vu > V,° and V, > V!:> (Area P), the equilibrium 
becomes [SA J, SAK j or (SAK, SAU J. When the R&D cost is relatively high for firm J 
but relatively low for firm U, that is, in area E, I, J, M, and N25, (SAJ ,Flj is the 
unique equilibrium; firm / utilizes its advantage in the adjustment cost, but firm U 
develops a new platform for the host country. Similarly when the R&D cost is relatively 
low for firm ./but relatively high for firm U(area B, C, D, G and H26), firm Uadjusts its 
home-preferred variety, but firm J develops a new localized platform: ( FL, SA u  ) .  
In the remaining region in figure 5, multiple equilibria exist. First, consider area 
F. Multiple equilibria in area F is the outcome that was discussed in other cases. 
However, in areas K, L, and O, it is possible that an outcome of the duopoly game is 
strictly worse for a multinational(s) than other possible outcomes from an ex post 
perspective; I define this outcome as ex post inefficient outcome. 
25 The Area J has unique equilibrium also because firm J never uses the host-preferred variety as its 
p la t form for  equi l ibr ium (SA, FL) 
26 Also firm U always uses its home-preferred variety as its platform for (FZ, SA) , and the area G has 
unique equilibrium. 
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Proposition 4.1: 
Suppose Ny e [N 2 , N l ] and Nj e [,<V4, Àr3 ]. An ex po.sf inefficient outcome can occur 
in following cases: 
(1) and K, >K^:AreaO 
(2) ^ ^ and F/ E : Area L 
(3)^e[^,^] and K,e[^,^]:AreaK 
Proof: 
If V n  i  = J,U,  are in the area L, three equilibria exist: (SA J ,SAK ) ,  (SAK ,SAU ) ,  and 
[FL, SAu j. Since V3° = V(J >V,> Vf = V", the order of the profits of firm J becomes 
nJ (SAk , SAU ) > 7rJ (FL, SAU ) > nJ (SAJ, SAK ), and firm J can earn higher profit at 
(SAK,SAu^j that at (FL,SAU ) without harming firm U (see case (v)); (FL,SAU) is 
ex post inefficient. Similarly, in area O, possible equilibria are {SAJ, SAK j, (SAf:, SAU j, 
and {SAJ  ,FL}. {SAJ  ,FL} is ex post inefficient because V t D  = V" > Vv  > V,D  = V,G  
and nJ nu {SAJ,FL) > nJ (SAK,SAU) (see case (vi)). Finally, consider 
the area K that has four equilbria: (SA J ,  SAK  ) ,  (SAK ,  SAU  j, (SA J , F/, j, and 
(FL, SAu j. Firm Ucan earn higher profit at (SAJ, SAK j than at (SAJ, FLj without 
changing the profit of firm / because Vf >Vv >Vf. Also, firm J can earn higher profit 
at than at because ^ > F, > ^ . Therefore, and 
(SA J ,  FL j  are ex post inefficient outcomes. QED 
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Notice that the ex post inefficient outcome emerges due to the unknown 
equilibrium in the subgame. That is, in areas K, L, and O, either the FL strategy or the 
SA strategy is not a dominant strategy for a multinational(s), and the equilibrium of the 
game depend on the multinationals' choice of platforms in the second stage which is 
unknown in the first stage. This leads to the possibility of an ex post inefficient outcome. 
Moreover, Note that both firms have highly similar cost structures in area K, and this 
makes for a larger chance for ex post inefficient outcome. 
From cases (v) and (vi), we know that Vf, / = 1,2,3,4, and , j = 1,3, are 
non-decreasing in dh ,  h = J,U. Therefore, Proposition 3.1 and Corollaries 3.1.1/3.1.2 
hold here. Notice that the arguments for multiple equilibria in these propositions and 
corollaries hold for the area K only. 
Lastly, consider the consumer welfare of the three countries. Since the outcome 
of the game is a mixture of cases (vi) and (vii), the analysis of welfare in three countries 
is also a mixture of them. Moreover, due to the multiple equilibria in areas F, G, J, K, L, 
O, and P, the welfare in each country is highly ambiguous and unpredictable. That is, for 
given sizes of the two home countries, neither home country has a dominantly large 
market, and the firms' platform choices depend on the strategic interaction with its 
competitor rather than on the size of the home markets; any country can be either worse-
ofif or better-off, depending on which of the multiple equilibria is achieved. 
The welfare analysis for all cases is summarized in the following remark. 
Remark: 
1. When a country has a considerably larger market than others, the consumer 
welfare in this country is not affected by the strategic choice of multinationals. 
2. When a country has a considerably smaller market than the others, the SA 
strategy by a multinational(s) reduces consumer welfare in that country. 
3. When a home country h has a moderately sized home market, consumer welfare 
in home country h and the host country is more likely to depend on the strategic 
interaction of the multinationals rather than on the size of home country h. 
4. When the two home countries have moderately sized home markets, the welfare 
in the three countries is highly ambiguous because it depends more on the 
strategic interaction of two multinationals in the second stage, as well as choices 
in the first stage. 
Conclusion 
The third chapter discussed two multinationals' choice of production strategy in 
a culturally different host country assuming the given initial platform varieties of two 
firms for the SA strategy. This chapter relaxes the assumption of given platforms and 
allows each firm to choose its platform for the SA strategy. To illustrate this, I consider a 
situation in which demands for a new product emerges in the home and host countries 
simultaneously. Two multinationals are assumed to have their production facility in their 
home countries and to consider entering the home and host market simultaneously. The 
demand and technology structures in the third chapter hold here. The duopoly game in 
this chapter is assumed to be a two-stage game. In the first stage, two firms adopt their 
optimal production strategy between the FL and SA strategies; in the second stage, each 
firm chooses the optimal platform if it adopted the SA strategy in the first stage. 
In this situation, the size of home markets plays a major role in firms' decision 
about their platform for the SA strategy in the second stage. Generally speaking, when a 
firm's home market is relatively large (or larger than other countries), the firm is more 
likely to use its home-preferred variety as its platform for the SA strategy. Then the firm 
can earn higher profit from the larger market, that is, its home market, but the profit in 
the host country is reduced. In terms of the consumer welfare, the host country loses 
welfare, but the home country which has the large market doesn't lose consumer welfare. 
Conversely, when the host market is large, the firm's platform for the SA strategy is the 
host-preferred variety, and the home country is the one that loses consumer welfare due 
to the SA strategy. The relative size of two home countries affects the firms' choice of 
platform and production strategy. A firm from a relative large country may adopt the FL 
strategy or uses its home-preferred variety as its platform for the SA strategy; another 
firm from a relatively small country is more likely to adopt the SA strategy using its 
host-preferred platform. The smaller home country and the host country lose welfare due 
to the SA strategy. If all three countries have relatively similar sized markets, the firms' 
choice of platform depends more on the competitor's strategy, and there is more 
possibility for multiple equilibria to exist. Furthermore, it is possible that an outcome of 
the duopoly game is strictly worse for a multinational(s) than other possible outcomes 
from an ex post perspective. 
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Chapter 5. Extension of the Duopoly Model: Strategic Interaction 
under Asymmetric Home Competition 
Introduction 
The third and the fourth chapters developed a model of the strategic interaction 
of two multinationals in a host country that is culturally different from their home 
countries. Although the two home countries in the previous chapters are assumed to have 
different cultural backgrounds and different size markets, the market structures in the 
two home countries are assumed to be symmetric; two multinationals earn monopoly 
profits in their home markets. However, it is sometimes argued that some countries have 
relatively more competitive markets, but some countries have less competitive markets. 
Therefore, this chapter will modify the model in the fourth chapter to study the effect of 
asymmetric home competition on multinationals' strategic decisions and consumer 
welfare in countries. 
In this chapter, I will consider a duopoly model that is essentially the same as 
that used in the fourth chapter, except for the number of firms in the two home countries. 
If a home country allows more entrants into the market, given other parameters, the 
multinational from this country is less likely to adopt the FL strategy because the return 
from the additional R&D cost to develop a platform for the home country is reduced. 
Therefore, the SA strategy becomes a more favorable strategy for this multinational. 
When the multinational chooses the SA strategy, a more competitive home market makes 
the host-preferred variety a more favorable platform for the multinational. Furthermore, 
it is possible that the entry of new local firms in a home country can change the strategic 
decision of the multinational from the other home country and can increase consumer 
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welfare in that other home country. Also it is possible that the entry of new local firms in 
the home country increases the profit of the multinational if the size of the host market is 
large enough. 
Assume that two multinationals J and U, located in two different home countries, 
J and U, respectively, have the technology used in the third and fourth chapters. Further, 
they already have their production facility in their home countries and consider entering 
the emerging market for a product in the home and host market simultaneously. Unlike 
the fourth chapter, multinationals may or may not be the sole supplier in their home 
country, as new local entrants in each home country may enter this emerging market. 
Like multinationals, assume that potential local entrants already have a production 
facility and currently produce other products.  Once a local firm in a home country i  
decides to enter this new product market,  i t  develops a new product with fixed cost V j ,  
i  = J,U. 
Turning to the demand structure, consider the same demand as in the previous 
chapters; the inverse demand for a variety 9' in a country j is given by: 
Model 
where (a,y, X) are positive parameters, 0J is the preferred variety in country and 
6' is the supplied variety by firm i. q' represents the total sales of the variety 
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produced by firm i. As discussed in the previous chapters, if b < y 27, firms supply only 
the preferred variety in a country j:  0' = 9'.  
Multinationals have the strategy set S' = ^ FL, SA )| ,  i  = J,U, where 9' '  
is the platform variety that multinational i  chooses. However, local firms produce only 
the home-preferred variety without using the adjustment technology. Other assumptions 
about the cost structure used in the third and fourth chapters also hold here. Given 
technology, the two multinationals play the duopoly game in the following sequences: 
1. The policy makers in home countries decide the policy of entry in home markets. 
2. Given entry policy, local firms enter the home market by developing a home-
preferred variety. Simultaneously, the two multinationals choose their optimal 
production strategy s'  eS' ,  i  = J,U. 
3. Given the optimal production strategy that was chosen in the second stage, if 
multinational i adopts j strategy, then multinational i chooses the 
optimal platform variety 9' ' .  
4. Given the prior stage decision, firms (multinationals and local entrants) choose 
their output. 
The intuition behind the sequence of actions in the game is the same as that in 
the fourth chapter, except the entry of local firms which occurs in the first and second 
stages. Notice that, in the second stage, local firms also immediately choose their 
optimal strategy, which is unique: FL strategy. Therefore, local firms skip the third stage. 
27 From the previous chapters, b is the additional marginal cost to adjust a platform. 
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First, consider the market structure in home market j ,  j  =./ ,  U . Suppose that 
there are firms in home country j:  one multinational and ojj -1 identical local 
entrants. Under the given technology and market structure, the profit maximization 
problem of multinational j is: 
where q" and q'j are total sales of the product produced by multinational j and by 
local entrants, respectively, and cj is the total marginal cost of multinational j, which 
is: 
SA strategy: c™ =Cj+b-6' | 
FL strategy: cj = c j  
where c;. is the base marginal cost to produce a platform. The optimal output level and 
profit of multinational j are: 
A 
N 
/ 
max q1" a -
N 
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Similarly, the output and profit of a local firm are: 
N, 
[(Oj +1 )/L 
N, 
X j  =  
(i(Oj +l) A 
(a + c"-2cj 
Notice that a local firm develops and produces only the home-preferred variety, and its 
marginal cost is always c;. 
Strategic Interaction 
Given the profit structure in home markets, the two multinationals play a two-
stage duopoly game, and there are four possible outcomes: (FL, FL), (SA, FL), (FL, SA), 
(SA, SA). As discussed in the fourth chapter,  when any multinational adopts the SA 
strategy, the profits of the two multinationals depend on the choice of platform in the 
second stage.28 
Suppose both multinationals adopts the FL strategy in the first stage: (FL, FL). 
The joint profits of multinational i, i =./, U - exclusive of entry cost - are: 
n>FL,FL -+-%f (*-c) ~2V,> (to, +1) À 7/1 
When multinational J adopts the SA strategy, but multinational U uses the FL 
28 The detailed analysis for the game is the same as that in the fourth chapter. 
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strategy, the joint profits of the two multinationals - exclusive of entry costs - are: 
nsA,FL (6j ) -  7-5—+—£-(a-c-2bdP J 'K} -Vj 
\(Oj + 1) A "A 
n$A,FL [ej ) - -, TTrr(a_c) +-zf{a-c + bdPJ'K) ~2Vu 
ycOy +1 j A 
Multinational J chooses 6J  or 6K  as its platform depending on the relative market 
size and number of firms in its home country: 
If Nj > Q jjjNk , then 0P  = 6J  and: 
) =  ("  -  ^) 2  +  ^ -  2  w ^ 
n
'sA.FL = -, Trrr(',~t:'} +~^ f{a^ c+b^ ) (cou+1) A yz 
If ^ , then ^ and: 
- c - ^ ( a - c ) '  - F ,  
{(o j  +  1j  a  
(ffly+l) X y/L 
where & J = 
9 (0, 
a-c-bd' 
lia-c^-cofid'  
,  i ,  j  = J,U .  Notice that © 1 is increasing 
in (Oj : the more competition there is in home country J, the larger the region of Nj for 
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which 6k is the optimal platform choice for multinational J29. 
Similarly, in equilibrium (FL, SA), the optimal platform variety of multinational 
U and the joint profit - exclusive of entry cost - of the two multinationals are: 
If AT, >0""%, then 6^=9" and: 
n f l  ^ K)~7T~V7(a~c) +^{ a~CJrbdU)  ~ 2Vj  
H+i) ^ 
n i,sA [0 U)~ rtv™7(a~c) +-^j{a~c~2 b d U) ~Vu (%+!) A 
If Nv  < &u ' jNk  , then 6P ,  = 0K  and: 
n 
(tVj +1) A yA 
n f l  •S A{d K)~ ,  {a-c-a>X Jbdu) + -^-(a-c) -VC J  (Û)V  +1) A 
Like (SA, FL), 0 ' is increasing in cov  : higher competition in home country U is 
more likely to make multinational U choose 6K  for its platform. 
Turning to (SA, SA), the two multinationals play a sub-game to choose their 
platforms. Profits of multinational i in (SA, SA) is: 
71 sa.sa(0j>0u) = -,  ~-(a-c-û) ibdp ' ' s j  + —^ (ti - 2 (c + bdp '*K) + (c + bd'J-K)) -V i  
yû)i + 1J A 
29 90' 
do). 
^{a j  +1)nk 
V 9^/ y 
[ci — c -bdJ  (g. — c + bdJ  ^ — a + cj 
2 (o — c) + cùjbd 
> 0 for 0)j > 1 
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where i  = J,U, j  = J,U , and i  ^  j .  As analyzed in the fourth chapter, the optimal 
platform of multinational i  is either 9' or 9 '  due to the convexity of the profit 
function30. The profits of the two multinationals in the four possible equilibria are shown 
in table 8. As in chapter four, from the profit structure, the following relations are 
obtained. 
K»')2 (eJ,e")^  «„<«, = n"X 
= ®""X 
(»'>«") a (e' .e" )«»,<*, = n^X 
K  . • 2  K )  «  n , <  N ,  =  ô J " N k  
where fiV = 4(<».+1) ^ a - c + bd }  - bd' ^ 
9®, . Notice that vV, > jV2 and vV, > iV4 
31
. Also, 
assuming du  > dJ , jV3 > TV, and /V4 > A'2. The interpretation of the above relations is 
the same as that in the fourth chapter. When Nv < N2, a dominant strategy for 
multinational U in this sub-game is the choice of 9K . When N,; > 1\\, 9U is a 
dominant strategy of multinational U. Otherwise, multinational U will choose either 9U  
or dK for its platform, depending on its beliefs about multinational f s choice of 
30 For detail analysis, refer to chapter four. 
" # , -#2=f4(^+l) ' /9%Vw%/(2(a-c) -W))>0 and 
#3 - +1)' /9w, /(2(a-c) - W )) > 0. 
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platform. The strategic decision of multinational J is similar. Figure 6 shows the pattern 
of equilibrium of this sub-game. As shown before, &' j is increasing in coi : the region 
of Nj that makes 0K a dominant platform strategy of multinational i enlarges if 
multinational i faces more competition in its home country i. In addition, notice that 
ÙJ (equivalently Nh, h = 2,3 ) is increasing in coj 32: 0' is less likely to be a 
dominant platform strategy of multinational i ,  as competition in home country i  
increases. Furthermore, the change in coi affects Ù!J  more than & J 33 
Equilibrium of the Game 
Figure 6 shows that the multinationals' choice of platforms in the sub-game 
depends on the size of home countries, and there are seven possible cases. The two 
multinationals' choice of platforms in each case is summarized in table 8. If multiple 
equilibira do not occur in the equilibrium in the sub-game34, we can obtain the following 
decision rule of the multinational: 
nFL,SA > nSA,SA iff < ^3 
an'-
dco, 
8(o,+1)^ 
' V 9co, • / 
[a-c + bd1  -bd'^[co l  [a-c + bd'^-a + c^ 
2(a-c) + a/fid'  
2 (Ô'J - 0'^ ) T g (o, +1) Y (a - c + W ) - a + 
> 0 , for CO, > 1 
dco, 9 or 2(a-c) + co f id'  
> 0 , for cot > 1 
Multiple equilibria in the sub-game appear if N2  < Ny < and N4  < Nj < jV3 
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n f l , f l  >  nsa, f l  ^  k/ <  ^ 4 
where n\ y  represents the profit of multinational h - exclusive of entry cost - if 
multinational J and multinational U adopt the strategies x and y respectively, h = J,U, 
x and y = SA, FL . Critical values of fixed R&D cost are different in each case. They are 
summarized in table 9. As shown in chapter four, the decision rule of multinationals is 
more complicated in the 'multiple équilibra' case: area G in figure 6. 
if max = v: 
iff 
^sa.fl > nsa,sa ••v: 
71flm ^ ^ sa,sa vj >\3 — max = K 
iff = 
The general pattern of the equilibrium is the same as that in chapter four, the 
only change is that several critical values of the fixed R&D cost depend on the number 
of firms in the home countries.  Therefore, I  will  focus on the effect of co i ,  i  = J,U,on 
the critical values of the fixed R&D cost in each case. For a detailed discussion of the 
pattern of equilibrium, refer to chapter four. In addition, notice that VXA and V3A are 
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decreasing in cou and COj respectively35, and V : ,  i  = 1,2,3,4 is non-increasing in 
(Oj or (Dv 36. Generally speaking, as competition in home country h increases, h = J,U, 
the FL strategy becomes a less favorable strategy for multinational h given the R&D 
cost: that is, the return on the additional R&D cost required to develop a platform for the 
home country is reduced, and multinational h is more likely to adopt the SA strategy. 
Entry and Consumer Welfare in a Home Country 
Suppose that a new local firm enters home market U. This entry of a new local 
firm in home country U affects the strategic choice of multinationals in the first and the 
second stages of the game. Since Vh, h = 1,2, is non-increasing in coLJ , it is possible 
that multinational U may change its production strategy from FL to SA in the first 
"x i  1 t  i  11 t  
stage of game, given platforms in the second stage . Also since © ' and O • are 
increasing in cov, the optimal platform of multinational U can be switched from 6U to 
0K in the second stage, if the equilibrium in the first stage is (SA, SA). Moreover, it is 
possible that the increase in affects the strategic choice of multinational J, and 
consumer welfare in home country J can be reduced. 
35 af/ 
Gab 
_ 
r 
Ow./ 
V 
36 Since v2 
2bduNv  ^ 
v(6)t/+1) ^ j 
[a>u{a-c + bdu^-a + c^< 0 for <%>1 and 
V 
(d)j+1) A ;  
{o)j [a-c + bdJ  j - a  +  c j  <  0  f o r  COj >  1  
values are decreasing in COi; and CO j, respectively. Other critical values are independent on COh, 
37 Multinational U  could switch the production strategy from FL to SAU in the third, the sixth, and 
the seventh cases in table 8 due to increase in C0a ; from FL to SAK in the second, the fourth, the 
sixth, and the seventh cases. 
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For example, consider the following case. Assume Vj and Vu  are sufficiently 
high: a sufficient condition is Vj > V] and Vu > K38. In this case, both multinationals 
always adopt the SA strategy, and the equilibrium in the first  stage is always (SA, SA)3 9 .  
Notice that, as shown in the previous section, the platforms of the two multinationals 
still depend on the size of the home markets and the level of home competition. Suppose 
that there are currently cou firms in home country U, and a policy maker in U is 
considering allowing the entry of a new local firm. The number of firms in home country 
J is fixed. 
Turning to home market U, the price of the variety 0V  is: 
P u  =  — 7  ( a  +  ( O y C  +  b d p u ' u  )  
where dp u 'u  = \9y -  9U  j. When multinational U chooses 9U  as its platform for the SA 
strategy, dp u 'u  = 0 : if 6K  is the optimal choice of multinational U, dp"'" =du  .  At 
this price, the consumer welfare in home country [/becomes: 
W
" ( < • k  < " - « ) -  « " *  ) '  
2 [COy + lj A 
where Wu  (i , j)  represents the welfare in home country U given the platform 9P  of 
3 8  Vx  and V3  are the highest critical values of Vx  and V3  in every cases. 
39 The example here is only one possible specification, and the reduction of the consumer welfare can 
occur in different specifications. However, this example is easy to analyze because we can ignore the 
game in the first stage and can analyze only second stage. 
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multinational U and <% firms. Suppose that a new local firm enters home market U, 
and it makes multinational U switch its platform from 6U  to 6K  ; figure 7 shows that 
this case can happen in areas A, B, C, and D. As mv increases due to the entry of a 
local firm, Nh ,  h = 1,2 shifts to the right, and multinational U changes its platform 
from 0U to 6k . 
Now consider areas C and D in figure 740. The entry of a new local firm in home 
country U will not decrease consumer welfare in that country. This can be proved in the 
following way. The FOC for firm i in home country U is: 
dp,, À 
+ 9, - C, = - 9, T;— c, = 0 
Summing across a>y firms in country U yields: 
œuPu = 0  
i  
Call the price and output in the initial situation pi, Ql and the price and output in the 
new situation p),, Qy. Then: 
(5.1) = O 
40 Mathematical condition is Vy >V t ,  Vj > V3 ,  N {(Cùv  +1) < Nv  < N }  (COv) , and Nj > N3(cùj) 
for area D; Vy>Vx, Vj >V3, N2 (cOy +1) < Ny < (a>u ) , and Nj<NA(a>j) for area C. 
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(5.2) +1 )p\j  + ôyA/Ny -cou  ~{c + bdu) -0 
Subtract equation (5.1) from equation (5.1) to get: 
(Pu-c-bdu} + mu^p\J-pl^ + i^QhNu) = 0 
Hence, if pi >c + bdu  ,  p[, < pi and consumer welfare in home country U increases41. 
The new consumer welfare becomes: 
2ycOy +2) A 
The non-negative profit condition of the new entrant is n'y (<% +1) > V r / .  Since the 
platform of multinational J becomes dK  after the entry occurs, this condition can be 
rewritten as: 
A/„>r„-hL±2l 
a-c + bdu) 
However, if pi <c + bdu , then multinational U won't serve home country U, and 
i  i  iu a — c — bdh  
The condition Py >C + bd is equivalent to 0)v  < 
6(7" 
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consumer welfare in U is unchanged; the new entrant replaces multinational i f2 .  The 
non-negative profit condition of the new entrant is: 
{mu + 1) 
(a-cf 
Note that, in either case, consumers in country U cannot be worse off. In addition, notice 
that the profit of firm J in the host country will be reduced. The above results are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.1: 
Given Vv ,  cou ,  and co}, suppose Vv>V { ,  VS>V3 ,  TV, (^ +1) < Nv  < TV, (cov ), and 
Nj > N3 [o)J) or Nj < N:Xo)j). Then, allowing a new entrant in home country [/has 
the following impact: 
1. If cûy > êv  and TV;/ > V ( /(a> ( /  +1)2 /(a-cf , the consumer welfare in home 
country U is unchanged. 
2. If coy <êv  and Nv  > Vv(cDy +2)2  /(a-c + bdu)2, consumer welfare in home 
country U increases. 
3. In either case, the entry of a new local firm in home country U makes the 
platform of multinational U from 6U  to 9K  .  
4. Otherwise, the entry doesn't occur. 
p\j < c + bdu u a — c — bd 
6^ 
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where œv  =(a-c-bdu)/bdu  .  
Now consider the areas A and B in figure 7. In these areas, it is possible that the 
entry in home country U can make firm U change its platform from 0U to 0K , and 
proposition 5.1 can hold in these areas. Further, when that happens, firm Ts choice of 
the platform may also be changed from 0K to 6J, and the profit of firm J in the host 
country becomes smaller43, equilibrium could be changed from (6K ,du) to (dJ, 6K ). 
Thus, the more competitive home market of firm U can make firm U choose 0K  , and 
then firm / uses its home-preferred variety for the platform due to the reduced 
profitability of the host markets. Consumer welfare in home country J is thus changed 
from WJ(6K ,(0j) to WJ(0J ,a>j) where WJ(i , j) is consume welfare in home J 
with platform i of multinational J and j firms in home market. Further, consumer welfare 
in home country J increases: 
doesn't increase consumer welfare in [/but increases consumer welfare in J. 
Proposition 5.2: 
Suppose Vv>Vx ,  Vj >V3 ,  and JV4(a>j) < Nj < N3(a>j).  Also suppose that A7,, 
43 In area except A, B, C, and D, the profit of firm J  in K  is unchanged because the platform of firm U  is 
u n c h a n g e d .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e  p r o f i t  o f  f i r m  J i n  K  i s  n o n - i n c r e a s i n g  w h e n  a  n e w  l o c a l  f i r m  e n t e r s  i n  U .  
44 Multinational U  doesn't serve home country U  due to the entry of a new local competitor. 
Moreover, in a special situation44, it is possible that the entry of a new local firm in U 
satisfies JV, (pov +1) < Nv < TV, (œv ) or N2 (ty(/ +1) < Ny < N2 (cov ). Then, allowing 
entry in home country U can increase consumer welfare in home country / if one of the 
following conditions holds: 
1. <0y > âv and Nv > Vv (mv +1)2 /(a - cf 
2. cûjj <a>u and TVy > Vv(coy + 2)2 /(a-c + bdu)2  
Furthermore, if the condition 1 holds, the entry of a new local firm in home country U 
can raise consumer welfare in home country /  instead of that in home country U. 
Proof: 
From the definitions, the condition for the area A is N 4  ( ) < N J < N 3  (coj  ) and 
N2(û)l, +1) < N(l < iV2(&>,/). Similarly, the condition for the area B is defined by 
N4(ci)J)<NJ <N3(o)j) and TV,(cy,; +1) < N,, < N{(oju). As shown in proposition 5.1, 
the non-negative profit of the new entrant in home country U is <y(/ > oju and 
Ny > Vu ((o,j +1)21(a - cf, if multinational U doesn't serve home country (/; cou < mu 
and Nv > Vv (&>„ + 2)2 /(a-c + bdu )2 if multinational U continues to serve home 
country U. QED 
In summary, as propositions 5.1 and 5.2 imply, a more competitive home market 
in country U can make multinational U value the host market above the home market. 
Then, multinational / may respond by changing its platform to the home-preferred 
variety since multinational / values the home market above the host market. This 
increases consumer welfare in home country /. 
Entry and Profit of a Multinational 
Now consider the change in the profit of multinational U. If the entry of a new 
local firm doesn't change the equilibrium of game, the profit of multinational U is 
reduced because nuSASA{Oj ,d[,) is decreasing in mu45. In cases C and D in figure 7, the 
equilibrium of the duopoly game is changed due to the entry, and multinational U earns 
less profit than before due to the entry in home country U. In detail, consider area C. 
N2{g>u) <Nv holds in area C, and it implies nu{6K,0U^^n13{6K,6K,(ov) from 
the definition of N2(oji;) . Since nu(0k,dK,oju) is decreasing in a>v, the following 
relation holds, and the profit of multinational U decreases due to the entry in home 
country U: 
Similarly, from the definition of /¥,(<%) and the functional property of the 
following relation of the profit function holds, and the profit of multinational U is 
reduced in area D: 
* +1) < 
However, in areas A and B in figure 7, it is possible that the profit of multinational U can 
„ _ + forgivenplatforms 
9j and 0[j . 
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be increased by the entry of a new local firm in home country U. First, consider the area 
A and suppose that equilibrium is changed from {0K ,du,cov) to (<9J ,0K,cov +1). 
From the definitions of N2 (o)u ) and N2 (<% +1), N2 (&>,, ) < Nu < N2 {au +1) implies: 
+1) > +1) 
Since nu iOJ,.) > niJ {0K,.) for given platform of multinational U and number of firms 
in home market U, the order of profits of multinational [/becomes: 
,r k 
+1) > +1) and +1) > +1) 
Notice that the order of nv (0K ,6K ,cou +1) and ttu {Gj , 6U, cov +1) is undetermined. 
Because nu (., <%) > nu (., cov +1) for given platforms of the multinationals, the above 
inequalities imply that the profit at the new equilibrium can be higher than the previous 
profit; nu (0K, 6U, co u ) < 7tu {6J, dK, +1) < nu (6J, 6K, coy ) is possible. Similarly, 
consider area B and the change of equilibrium from (0K ,QU ,cov) to {6J, 0K, cov). 
Then the following orders of profits of multinational [/hold from 
/V, {coy ) < Nl; < Ni (m,, +1) and the functional property of nu (.) : 
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^ ( ^ , ^ , ^ + l ) ^ ^ ( ^ , ^ , ^ + l ) > ^ ( ^ , ^ , ^ + l ) > ^ ( ^ , ^ , G ) _ + l )  
The order of n u ( 0 K ,6u,cov) and ttu( 0 j , 0 k , m v )  is ambiguous. The above 
inequalities and nu (.,©„) > nu (., cou +1) imply that the profit at the new equilibrium 
can be higher than before; nu{dK,Gu,cou) < nu(6J,0K,cou+\) < nu(<9J,0K,coL,) is 
possible. 
Proposition 5.3: 
Given Vu, coy, and a>j, suppose Vv>Vx, Vj>V3, and N4 {ws )>NJ>N^(cOJ). Also 
suppose Nl (coy )<Nu<Nl (cov +1) or N2 (dy(/ )>NU>N2 (cou +1). Then, allowing 
entry in home country U can raise the profit of multinational U if one of the following 
conditions holds; 
1. % ><%, Njj > Vu(cûjj +1)2/(a-c)2, and NU<N"U 
2. g>v<g)v, Ny > Vu(o)u + 2)2 /(a-c + bdu)2, and NV<N" 
, , b(2a-2c + bdJ -1bdu)(dJ + 2du)(a>,, + 1)2(&>;/ + 2)2 
where M, = — % : % u ,/ u—~~NK , and 
9[(®j/ +1) (tif —c) — ((Dy +1) (a — c — bd (cOy +1)) ] 
« b(2a — 2c + bdJ — 2bdu )(<iJ + )(<yy +1)2 ,, 
Proof: 
From proposition 5.1, multinational [/can change its platform from 0U to 0K due to 
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the entry of a new local firm in home country U if the first two inequalities in condition 
1 or 2 hold. Further, as discussed before, the profit at the new equilibrium can be higher 
than that at the previous equilibrium in areas A and B. Supposing the first two 
inequalities in condition 1 hold, proposition 5.1 shows that multinational Ucontinues to 
serve home country U with platform 6K and earns (0K, 6', cou +1) . The entry of 
a new local firm in home country U increases the profit of multinational U if: 
^ 6(2a-2c + 6^ +2<f )(<%, + 1)2(^ + 2)' ^ -
9[(toy +1)2 (a - c)2 - +1)2 (a - c - bdu {(Oy +1))2 ] 
Supposing the first two inequalities in condition 2 holds, multinational U stops 
supplying home country Uand earns the profit NK{a-c + bdJ)2 /9A from only the 
host country. The entry of a new firm in home market U raises the profit of multinational 
[/if; 
A' A a - c  +  M ' f  
_ 6(2a - 2c + - 2Z%f )(^ + 2(^)(^ +1)' ^ 
" 
N* 
QED 
Proposition 5.3 suggests that, if the host market is sufficiently large, a more 
competitive home market U can increase the profit of multinational [/because 
multinational U increases its sales in the host market to avoid the severe home 
competition. 
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Conclusion 
The fourth chapter developed a model of the strategic interaction of two 
multinationals in a host country that is culturally different from their home countries. 
That simple model assumed symmetric home competition in the sense that only a 
multinational serves its home market. However, it is sometimes argued that some 
countries have relatively more competitive markets, while some countries have less 
competitive markets. Therefore, this chapter has modified the duopoly model in the 
fourth chapter to allow asymmetric home competition of the two multinationals to 
examine the effect of asymmetric home competition on multinationals' strategic decision 
and consumer welfare in both home countries. 
To illuminate this, I considered the duopoly model that is essentially the same as 
that in the fourth chapter except for the number of firms in the two home countries; 
and coy firms, including multinationals and local firms, enter home markets J and U, 
respectively. This modified duopoly model has a similar pattern of equilibrium to that in 
the fourth chapter. The asymmetric home competition affects the strategic decisions of 
the multinationals in the following ways. If a home country allows more entrants in the 
market, given other parameters, the multinational from this country is less likely to adopt 
the FL strategy because the return to the additional R&D cost to develop a platform for 
the home country is reduced. Therefore the SA strategy becomes a more favorable 
strategy of this multinational. When the multinational chooses the SA strategy, the more 
competitive home market makes the host-preferred variety the more favorable platform 
of the multinational. Since additional entry of a local firm could make the multinational 
change its production strategy or optimal platform, it could influence consumer welfare 
in the home country; consumer welfare increases or, at least, is unchanged. Furthermore, 
it is possible that the entry of new local firms in a home country can make the 
multinational stop serving that country. In a specific situation, the multinational changes 
its platform from the home-preferred variety to the host-preferred variety responding to 
the entry in its home country, and its competitor in the host market also changes its 
platform from the host-preferred variety to the home-preferred variety to avoid the 
competition in the host market; then the entry of a new local firm in a home country can 
increase consumer welfare in a different home market. In this situation, it is possible that 
the entry of new local firms in the home country increases the profit of the multinational 
if the size of the host market is sufficiently large. 
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Chapter 6. General Conclusion 
Although the effect of cultural differences between countries on strategic 
decision of multinationals was widely perceived by researchers, it has been neglected in 
most previous studies. The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop a model of 
multinationals under different cultural backgrounds and apply that model to study the 
effect of cultural dissimilarity between countries on the strategic behavior of firms. 
Another important motive for this dissertation is that most multinationals seem 
to produce localized or localizable products instead of standard products. Several 
surveys show that most multinationals prefer to develop a standard product and adjust it 
to fit local preferences. These types of products and technology were studied in the 
literature on the flexible technology (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994; Norman and Thisse, 
1999; Norman, 2002) but have been neglected in studies of multinationals and exporters. 
Using these motivations, this dissertation examines (1) the role of the culture-
specific demand on the strategic behavior of the firms, (2) when and why multinationals 
and exporters introduce localized products instead of standard products when there are 
cultural difference between countries, and (3) the influence of both the cultural 
difference between two countries and the strategic decisions of firms on the welfare in 
the home and the host country. 
The second chapter of this dissertation developed a monopoly model to study 
the effect of the culture-specific demand on the firm's choice of location and production 
strategy. The main results in the second chapter are as follows. The firm has more 
incentive to become a multinational if the host country has considerably different 
preferences from the home country. Furthermore, the cultural similarity between 
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countries affects the firm's choice of production strategy. When the preferences in the 
home and foreign countries are similar, the firm is more likely to introduce a standard 
variety (or platform) and adjust it to serve two countries (standardization strategy). If 
two countries have significantly different preferences, developing two completely 
different varieties becomes a better choice for the firm (localization strategy). Turning to 
consumer welfare in home and host countries, being a multinational could harm 
consumer welfare in the host or home country: the more cost efficient production 
strategy of a multinational doesn't necessarily mean low marginal costs in both countries. 
The third chapter developed a duopoly model based on the demand and 
technology structure discussed in the second chapter, assuming the platforms for the 
standardization strategy of two multinationals are given by their home-preferred variety; 
multinational U is assumed to be culturally unfamiliar with the host market, but 
multinational J is assumed to be relatively culturally familiar. When both multinationals 
are from home countries that are considerably culturally different from the host country, 
they are more likely to adopt the localization strategy; that is, they develop a new 
localized platform to serve the host market. If the two home countries are culturally 
similar to the host country, the two firms adopt the standardization strategy; they adjust 
their home-preferred variety to serve the host market. When the two multinationals come 
from home countries that are culturally dissimilar to each other, firm J may adopt the 
standardization strategy because it has advantage in adjustment cost, but firm Umay 
develop a new localized variety. When both home countries have similar cultural 
backgrounds, a symmetric equilibrium or multiple equilibia is the more likely outcome 
of the duopoly game. In addition, the profit analysis shows that, due to the strategic 
interaction of the two firms, it is possible that the culturally unfamiliar firm could earn 
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the higher profit in the host country than does the culturally familiar firm. 
Chapter four relaxed the assumption of given platforms used in chapter three 
and allowed firms to choose their platform for the standardization strategy. The size of 
home markets is a major factor when firms choose their platform for the standardization 
strategy and production strategy. When a multinational has a relatively large home 
market, this firm is more likely to use its home-preferred variety as its platform. This 
choice reduces consumer welfare in the host country, but not its home country. 
Conversely, if the host market is large, the optimal platform of the firm is the host-
preferred variety. Its home country loses consumer welfare from this choice, but the host 
country doesn't lose the welfare. The relative size of the two home countries also affects 
the multinationals' decision; the multinational from the relatively small country is more 
likely to adopt the standardization strategy using its host-preferred platform, and 
countries that have relatively small market lose consumer welfare. When all countries 
have the similar size of markets, multiple equilibria is more likely to emerge. In this case, 
the ex post inefficient outcome can appear. 
The fifth chapter modified the duopoly model to allow asymmetric home 
competition. If a home country has the more competitive market, the multinational from 
this country is more likely to adopt the standardization strategy. Even if this 
multinational chooses the SA strategy, the more competitive home market makes the 
host-preferred variety a more favorable platform for the multinational. In a specific 
situation, the multinational changes its platform from the home-preferred variety to the 
host-preferred variety responding to the entry in its home country, and its competitor in 
the host market also changes its platform from the host-preferred variety to the home-
preferred variety to avoid the competition in the host market; then the entry of a new 
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local firm in a home country can increase consumer welfare in another home market and 
can raise the profit of the multinational. 
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Appendix 1. Tables 
Table 1. Foreign Affiliates of US-based MNE" in the high income countries6 (Population>ten 
million) 
GDPC Populationc Affiliates d Sales d Net income d 
(capita, ppp) (thousands) (per capita) (per capita) (per capita) 
Australia 28,290 19,890 41.08 ( 5 ) f  3068.28 (5) 171.64 (6) 
Belgium 28,930 10,348 53.54 (3) 4990.82 (4) 570.83 (2) 
Canada 29,740 31,630 60.92 (2) 10649.07(1) 456.21 (3) 
France 27,460 59,725 20.88 (6) 2108.48 (7) 58.05 (8) 
Germany 27,460 82,551 17.18(7) 2491.95 (6) 47.40 (10) 
Italy 26,760 57,646 12.73 (10) 1247.87 (8) 37.70 (12) 
Japan 28,620 127,210 5.63 (12) 1180.58 (10) 55.44 (9) 
Korea, Republic of 17,930 47,912 4.59(13) 386.31 (13) 27.80(13) 
Netherlands 28,600 16,215 79.19(1) 6978.17(2) 1164.60(1) 
Portugal 17,980 10,121 14.52 (8) 689.36 (12) 179.33 (5) 
Spain 22,020 41,101 13.48 (9) 1191.92 (9) 91.09 (7) 
Taiwan" 23,400 22,894 10.00(11) 1025.68(11) 46.78 (11) 
United Kingdom 27,650 59,280 45.56 (4) 6269.32 (3) 229.25 (4) 
a. Majority-owned foreign affiliates: the combined ownership of all U.S. parents exceeds 50 
percent. 
b. The classification of the high income countries follows the classification of the World Bank 
c. World Bank (2003) 
d. Number of affiliates, Sales, and Net income of US-based MNEs: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2002) 
e. Data for Taiwan: Estimated 2003 GDP per capita and estimated 2005 population, The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
f. Numbers in brackets denote the ranking. 
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Table 2. The property of the product produced in the host country by Korean-based 
multinationals 
Korea-based Standardized Standardized and locally Localized product 
Multinationals product (%) adjustable product (%) (%) 
2002" 2004* 2002 2004 2002 2004 
Motor vehicles and 
equipment 
10 15.6 60 46.9 30 37.5 
Electronics 20 25 56 51.8 24 23.2 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
13 5.9 60.9 82.4 26.1 11.8 
Precision Instrument 13.3 30.8 73.3 46.2 13.3 23.1 
Textiles, Apparel, and 
leather products 
28.6 21.4 50 42.9 21.4 35.7 
Chemical 44.4 19.4 50 64.5 5.6 16.1 
Overall 22.9 19.7 56.1 54.9 21 25.4 
a. "Foreign Direct Investment by Korea-based Manufacturing Firms 2002", D. Y. Kang, C. K. Park, 
W. B. Lee, C. W. Byun, KIET Issue Paper 2002-114, 2002 
b. "Foreign Direct Investment by Korea-based Manufacturing Firms 2004", D. Y. Kang, S. Y. Lee, 
W. B. Lee, S. H. Ahn, KIET Issue Paper 2004-162, 2004 
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Table 3. The property of products in Korea produced by Foreign-based multinationals 
Year 2003 " 
Standardized product 
(%) 
Standardized and 
locally adjustable 
product (%) 
Localized product 
(%) 
Foreign-based MNE in 
8 25 67 
Korea 
a. "Foreign Direct Investment in Korean Manufacturing Industry 2003", D. Y. Kang, C. K. Park, W. 
B. Lee, C. W. Byun, KIET Issue Paper 2003-140, 2003 
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Table 4. Duopoly profits of firms J and U in the host country, exclusive of entry costs 
state Profit of firm J and firm U 
n
",u \ _ ^ - c - 2 b d J  + M U ]  
n 
9X 
u _ Nk 
9A 
N. 
n ,k ~ ~ ^ f [ a ~ c ~ 2 b d J ]  
n 
9^ 
u _ Nk 
9A 
n 
J 
9A 
<u - h 
N, 
|~a-c + bdJ~^ -Vy 
[a - c  +  b d J J  -  V j  
^ - c  +  2 5 / j  
n 
71, 
J ^ K 
9A 
N. 
[a-c]'-F, 
~
V
" 
a. From the structure of profits, the following hold for all parameters: 
7tJxU > nJxK and 71 jj > 7TUK y, provided |i/A| > 0, X = J,K, y = U,K , and h  =  J , U  
No matter which strategy firm h plays, it earns higher profits when the other firm uses its original 
platform rather than the localized platform. 
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Table 5. Summary of the corollary 3.1.1 
^ T(4r) 
Same + (") 
+ (") - (+ )  
Multiple equilibria - (+)  + (") 
(&4, &4) -  (+ )  "  (+ )  
Table 6. Summary of the corollary 3.1.2 
^ T, ^  T 
+ 
- -
+ 
? ? + 
-
Multiple equilibria ? ? 
-
+ 
(&4, &4) 
-
+ ? ? 
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Table 7. Duopoly profits of the firms J and U in the home and the host countries when 
both firms adopt the SA strategy (Chapter 4) 
State Profit of firm J, profit of firm U 
71 .J &I.&4 4/1 
NK (a-c) '+—(a-c-26^+W^) 
NK 
^ s a . s a  ~ ^ y ( a ~ c )  + - ^ j - ( a - c - 2 b d u  + b d j S )  ~ E U -  V v  
n sa,sa 
71 JJ 
4/1 
Nu 
~4A 
NJ 
( a - c - b d v )  + ^ - ( a - c  +  b d j S }  - E y - V y  
9Â 
( a - c - b d J j  +  ^ - { a - c  +  b d u )  - E ;  - V 3  71 
^ / 9A 
n 
_ N '  
^ 
NJ 
j ( a - c )  +  —  { a - c - 2 b d u }  - E v - V v  
71, .J 
7t V &4.S4 
4A 
Nu 
9A 
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Table 8. Duopoly profits of the firms J and U in the home and the host countries when both firms 
adopt the SA strategy (Chapter 5) 
State Profit of firm J, profit of firm U 
y A^ / 
f A { "  4 +il(" 
-c-2W^+6^y 
- E j ~  Vj 
^ > „ + i  f A { a  • c )  +  « : ( "  
-c-26^+6^)' - E v - Vy 
y A^ / x2 
<0 +ii(" Vj 
- c - c O y b d " ^  
AJK 
+ (a-c + MJ 
9J, ^ 
2
- E u  -Vu 
j NJ 1 
- c - a > j b d J )  H  ( a ~ c  +  b d u )  
9A ^ / 
2
- E j  - V j  
c/ / 
"
c) +ii(a - c - 2 M ^ ) ' - ^ --Vu 
(9V) 
- c - o ) j b d J ^ j  H (û — Ci ~ Et 
9A ^ ^ 
- V j  
-c-coubdu) ^ , y _ -Vu 
Table 8. The choice of platform in different cases 
(•FL,FL) (FL,FL) {FL,FL) ( .FL,FL) (FL,FL) (•FL,FL) (FL,FL) 
(SA,FL) (SAK ,FL) ( ,SAK ,FL) ( .SAJ ,FL) (SAJ ,FL) ( .SAJ ,FL) (SAJ ,FL) 
(FL,SAK)  (FL,SAU)  (FL,SAU)  
a. Superscript refers the platform of a firm: J, U, and K mean QJ, 0", and 0K respectively. 
b. i - J ,  K  and j  =  U , K ,  i  ^  j  :  multiple equilibria exist 
Table 9. The critical values of Vl} and V; in the each equilibrium of the duopoly game (the first stage) 
<
 
VI s
f 
Nu >NX  vV2 
N4 
<
 
VI sT VI Nj >n3 
^ * V» v? = VX A  
V2 
<
^
r 
11 <
ÎX~ 
II X 
<I
X~ 
II V? ^ v2  v2° = V2 
V3 ^ * 11 f," = v3A V3g 
K ^ ^ V" = K KG = K 
a. Fj, V2 ,  V3 , and V4  are defined in the chapter 3. 
b. V/ = bcOyd Nu 
( c o [ ; + 1 )  A  
b a > j d J N j  
(CDj +1) A 
( 2  ( a  -  c )  -  a > j b d J }  
c. V" and V? are defined in the chapter 4. 
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Appendix 2. Figures 
Figure 1. Equilibrium states and R&D: given initial platform or case (i) 
E:(FL,SA)  
/ '  
B:(FL,SA)  
. 
or (FIA ,FL)  
S  S  
G:(&4,FZ) 
/ 
/ 
Y 
C:(SA,FL)  F: (SA,FL)  
% % K, 
Figure 2. Equilibrium states of the sub-game (SA, S'A )  in (N N  N ( ;  )  
H-. (E K ,E U )  
/ Z 
B:(& K ,Û U )  
' 
^ ^ 
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Figure 3 Equilibrium states and R&D cost: case (»') 
B:[FL,SA K )  
V\A 
A:(FL,FL)  
Note: Superscript refers the platform of a firm 
Table 4. Equilibrium states and R&D cost: case ( H i )  
C- .[FL,SA")  
/ 
/ 
B:[FL,SA U '  
/ 
D: (SA K ,FL)  
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Figure 5: Equilibrium states and R&D cost 
D:[FL,SA")  H- . [FL,SA V )  L  
or ,&4") 
C:(FL,SA U )  
x 
' 
G K O 
F- . {FL,SA U )  
or 
J  
A: (FL,FL)  I  M:(SA J ,FL)  
I: [SAJ ,FL) 
G and J: ^ S A J , F L ^j and ^ F L , S A U j  
L: (&4\&4^),or 
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Figure 6. Equilibrium states of the sub-game (SA, SA) in (vV,, N I ;  ) space: chapter 5 
N„ 
N, 
N, 
/:(f\ 9 U )  
B: (0 K , 0 U )  G:(g\ 
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F:(^, e K )  
N* M N, 
Figure 7. Change of equilibrium states of the sub-game (SA, SA ) due to increase in 
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